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DRAWEE BANK'S LIABILITY FOR
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CHECKHOLDER CAUSE OF ACTION
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INTRODUCTION

In an article written almost 60 years ago, a commentator
observed:
If the question were put to the average layman whether the
holder of a check.

. .

had any effective rights against the drawee

bank, it is believed that the almost universal response would be to
the effect that of course the holder may insist upon payment by
the bank, if there are funds on deposit to cover the amount. And
if the same question were propounded to the average lawyer, the
reply would be-at least if the lawyer had in mind the provisions
of the Uniform Negotiable Instruments Law-that the holder had
no rights against the bank.'
Although the Uniform Commercial Code has replaced the Uniform
Negotiable Instruments Law (the NIL),2 the above observation still
holds true. In recent years, courts have held almost uniformly that
in the absence of certification or acceptance of a check or some
other special circumstances a drawee bank has no obligation under
* Associate Professor of Law, Walter F. George School of Law, Mercer University. B.A.,
University of Wisconsin, 1972; J.D., Emory University, 1975. Member of the State Bar of
Georgia. The work of my research assistants, Joseph J. Mercer, Jr. and Jan P. Cohen, is
gratefully acknowledged.
1 Aigler, Rights of a Holder of Bill of Exchange Against the Drawee, 38 HARv. L. REV.
857, 857 (1925).
2 See U.C.C. § 3-101 official comment (1978). The official comment to section 3-101
provides: "Article [3] represents a complete revision and modernization of the Uniform Negotiable Instruments Law." Id. Notwithstanding this broad statement, the changes in the
Code are few in number and include much of the language used in the NIL. Penney, A
Summary of Articles 3 and 4 and Their Impact in New York, 48 CORNELL L.Q. 47, 48
(1962). The primary purpose of Article 3 was to counteract the lack of uniformity in the
application of the NIL to negotiable instruments throughout the United States, and to limit
the scope of the legislation to commercial paper. Id. at 49-50. Official comment 1 to section
3-103 defines commercial paper as "drafts, checks, certificates of deposit and notes ......
U.C.C. § 3-103 official comment 1 (1978).
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the Code to a checkholder to pay a check drawn upon itself.' It
makes no difference that, at the time the check is presented for
payment, the bank has sufficient funds of the drawer on deposit to
pay it. 4 Thus, while the drawer "customer" clearly has a cause of
action under the UCC against his bank for wrongful dishonor of a
check,5 it has been conceded that the checkholder does not have a
similar cause of action against the drawee bank.'
Of course, when the drawee refuses to honor a check, for
whatever reason, the holder7 usually has recourse on the instru' See, e.g., Conn v. Bank of Clarendon Hills, 53 Ill. 2d 33, 38, 289 N.E.2d 425, 428
(1972) (holder of check has no cause of action against drawee bank for wrongful dishonor
under § 3-409(1)); Galaxy Boat Mfg. Co. v. East End State Bank, 641 S.W.2d 584, 586 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1982) (drawee bank not liable to payee on check until drawee bank accepts or
certifies the instrument); see also 5A C. ZOLLMAN, BANKS AND BANKING § 204, at 544 (perm.
ed. 1973) (absent privity of contract, payee may not recover from drawee bank) [hereinafter
cited as BANKS AND BANKING]. Courts have interpreted sections 3-409 and 4-402 to bar any
cause of action for wrongful dishonor against a drawee bank that has neither accepted, nor
certified, the check presented to it. See, e.g., Bon Bon Prods., Ltd. v. Xanadu Prods., Inc.,
32 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 253, 257 (D. Mass. 1981) (§ 4-402); Shreveport Prod.
Credit Ass'n v. Bank of Commerce, 405 So. 2d 842, 845 & n.3 (La. 1981) (§ 3-409). Moreover, the UCC clearly provides that a drawee bank is under "no obligation to certify a
check." U.C.C. § 3-411(2) (1978). Nevertheless, under certain circumstances the drawee
bank may be liable to the holder of a check. For example, the official comment to section 3409(2) provides that a bank may be liable to a holder if it fails to accept a check although it
had represented that it would do so, or if the bank fails to comply with the terms of a letter
of credit. Id. § 3-409 official comment. In addition, where the issuance of a check clearly is
an assignment of funds, the drawee bank may be liable to the holder for wrongfully
dishonoring the check. 5A BANKS AND BANKING, supra, § 203, at'541. Three conditions must
be satisfied in order for a check to qualify as an assignment: "(1) The check must be drawn
on a specific fund; (2) there must be an agreement by the bank to pay certain checks with
specific funds; and (3) the bank must have knowledge of and agree to the equitable assignment pro tanto of the fund." Steinbrecher v. Fairfield County Trust Co., 5 Conn. Cir. Ct.
393, 401, 255 A.2d 138, 142 (1968); see also In re Schenck's Estate, 63 Misc. 2d 721, 724, 313
N.Y.S.2d 272, 280 (Sur. Ct. Suffolk County 1970) (check may be an assignment when parties
so intend); Banco Longoria, S.A. v. El Paso Nat'l Bank, 415 S.W.2d 1, 5 (Tdx. Civ. App.
1967) (parties may agree to make issuance of an instrument an assignment).
4 See Barnett Bank v. Capital City First Nat'l Bank, 348 So. 2d 643, 644 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1977); Morris Plan Co. v. Broadway Nat'l Bank, 598 S.W.2d 557, 559 (Mo. Ct. App.
1980).
5 U.C.C. § 4-402 (1978). The UCC defines a customer as "any person having an account
with a bank or for whom a bank has agreed to collect items [including] a bank carrying an
account with another bank." Id. § 4-104(1)(e); see also Marine Midland Bank, N.A. v. Price,
Miller, Evan & Flowers, 57 N.Y.2d 220, 225-26, 441 N.E.2d 1083, 1085-86, 455 N.Y.S.2d 565,
567-68 (1982) (berson for whom bank agrees to accept checks and to wire transfer funds
represented by the checks to another bank is bank's customer by the terms of the UCC).
a See, e.g., Conn v. Bank of Clarendon, 53 Ill. 2d 33, 38, 289 N.E.2d 425, 428 (1972);
Galaxy Boat Mfg. Co. v. East End State Bank, 641 S.W.2d 584, 586 (Tex. Civ. App. 1982).
7 The U.C.C. definition of the term "holder" will be used throughout this Article.
Under the UCC, a "holder" is a person "in possession of ... an instrument ... drawn,
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ment against the drawer and any indorsers of the instrument, 8 and
also may be able to recover from his transferor on the underlying
obligation. 9 Circumstances may arise, however, that leave the
holder without an adequate remedy. For example, after the bank's
refusal to pay the holder, the drawer may withdraw the funds and
abscond.1 0 The holder simply may be unable to find a solvent party
to the instrument,"" or the payee may be a gift beneficiary, or the
drawer may die shortly after the check is dishonored, or otherwise
12
repudiate his promise.
issued, or indorsed to him or to his order or to bearer or in blank." U.C.C. § 1-201(20)
(1978).
8 Id. §§ 3-413(2), 3-414(1); see also Stewart v. Citizens & S. Nat'[ Bank, 138 Ga. App.
209, 210-11, 225 S.E.2d 761, 762-63 (1976) (holder's remedy for dishonored check lies against
drawer and indorsers rather than drawee bank). At common law, it was well established that
an indorser, similar to a drawer, personally guarantees that the instrument will be paid. See
Bank of British N. Am. v. Ellis, 2 Fed. Cas. 622, 623 (C.C.D. Or. 1879) (No. 859); Johnson v.
Crane, 16 N.H. 68, 75 (1844); C. NORTON, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF BmLS AND NoTEs § 78,
at 218 (4th ed. 1914).
U.C.C. § 3-802(1)(b) (1978); see also Mansion Carpets, Inc. v. Marinoff, 24 App. Div.
2d 947, 947, 265 N.Y.S.2d 298, 299 (1st Dep't 1965) (action by payee for wrongful dishonor
may be brought on instrument or on the underlying obligation); Gaskins v. Duke, 483
S.W.2d 499, 500 (Tex. Civ. App. 1972) (holder who takes check for consideration may maintain action against drawer either on the instrument or on the original obligation). The principle that the obligation survives delivery of the check and continues until the check is
presented for payment was developed at common law, prior to the enactment of the Uniform Negotiable Instruments Law. See, e.g., Segrist v. Crabtree, 131 U.S. 287, 289 (1888)
(citing Sheehy v. Mandeville, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 253, 264 (1810)) (note does not discharge
original obligation except if parties expressly agreed to such); Clark v. Young & Co., 5 U.S.
(1 Cranch) 181, 182 (1803) (issuance of note for goods received is conditional payment and
does not discharge debt); 3 J. DANmL, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS
§ 1448, at 1491 (7th ed. 1933) (bill of exchange or promissory note does not discharge debt
absent agreement). Though this rule was not incorporated into any provision of the NIL, it
apparently survived the enactment of the statute. See, e.g., Hamilton v. R.S. Dickson & Co.,
85 F.2d 107, 107-08 (2d Cir. 1936) (debt is not discharged by issuance of check but is only
discharged when check is paid); Huron College v. Union County Trust Co., 77 F.2d 609, 613
(8th Cir. 1935) (payee may sue maker of note on original obligation if payee accounts for
instrument and maker is reasonably assured against threat of double payment, notwithstanding loss of instrument); In re Wegman Piano Co., 221 F. 128, 131 (N.D.N.Y. 1915)
(mere giving of note does not extinguish original claim or debt unless otherwise agreed).
10 See, e.g., Go-Tane Serv. Stations, Inc. v. Sharp, 78 IMI.App. 3d 785, 789-90, 397
N.E.2d 249, 249-51 (1979) (no cause of action lies against bank for dishonor when drawer
withdraws all his funds and leaves the jurisdiction).
1' See, e.g., Yacht Club Sales & Serv., Inc. v. First Nat'l Bank, 101 Idaho 852, 857, 623
P.2d 464, 469 (1980) (bank not liable for dishonoring check when drawer's account held
under writ of execution).
1'2See U.C.C. § 3-408 (1978) ("[w]ant or failure of consideration is a defense as against
any person not having the rights of a holder in due course"). Similarly, the drawer could die
before the check is presented for payment or is certified, in which case the check would be
revoked, leaving the holder with no cause of action against the drawer's estate, see In re
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The purpose of this Article is to suggest that the holder of a
check should be able to recover from a drawee bank that wrongfully dishonors the check. This is not a novel suggestion, as the
liability of a drawee bank to a checkholder for wrongful dishonor
was hotly debated prior to the enactment of the NIL.13 Discussion
of the issue virtually ceased upon enactment of the NIL, as it was
14
believed that the statute settled the question in favor of banks.
While the relevant language of the UCC varies somewhat from that
contained in the NIL, the UCC language is still generally interpreted as barring any action by the holder against the drawee
bank, except in special circumstances. After examining the preCode law regarding a drawee bank's wrongful dishonor of a check,
this Article will argue that there is no sound reason for insulating
banks from liability, and will propose two legal theories, not.precluded by the language of the Code, under which the holder of a
check should be able to recover from a drawee bank that wrongfully dishonors a check.

PRE-NIL

LAW

Prior to the enactment of the NIL, courts could not agree
whether the holder of an uncertified check could sue a bank for
refusal to honor the check even though sufficient funds were on
hand. Indeed, as one writer observed, the question "divided the
opinions of courts and jurists, and no little perplexed the legal pro-

fession.

15

In this uncertain environment, holders invoked, with

Ludlum's Estate, 158 Misc. 283, 284-85, 285 N.Y.S. 597, 600 (Sur. Ct. N.Y. County 1936); 3
J. DANIEL, supra note 9, § 1817, at 1855, or the drawer may stop payment and repudiate the
underlying obligation without incurring liability, see, e.g., Hardeman v. State, 154 Ga. App.
364, 365, 268 S.E.2d 415, 417 (1980); see also Ampex Corp. v. Appel Media, Inc., 374 F.
Supp. 1114, 1116 (W.D. Pa. 1974) (under the Code, drawer may raise defense of lack of
consideration against one who has not paid value); Smith v. Gentilotti, 371 Mass. 839, 841,
359 N.E.2d 953, 955 (1977) (since donee is not a holder in due course, his claim is subject to
the defense of lack of consideration).
" See infra notes 15-56 and accompanying text.
4 See Eastman Kodak Co. v. National Park Bank, 231 F. 320, 322 (S.D.N.Y. 1916)
(NIL eliminated need to prove that check was not an assignment), aff'd, 247 F. 1002 (2d Cir.
1917); Superior Nat'l Bank v. National Bank of Commerce, 99 Neb. 833, 836, 157 N.W.
1023, 1024 (1916) (NIL clearly provides that bank is not liable on check until it has accepted the check); F. BEUTEL, BEuTEL's BRANNAN NEGOTIABLE INsTRUMENTS LAw § 189, at
1325 (7th ed. 1948) (holder has no cause of action under NIL against drawee bank if bank
states that the check will be paid upon presentment).
253 J. DANIEL, supra note 9, § 1836, at 1879. Compare Munn v. Burch, 25 Inl. 21, 26
(1860) (drawee becomes holder of funds for payee upon presentment and thus must account
to payee for such funds) and Fonner v. Smith, 31 Neb. 107, 109, 47 N.W. 632, 633 (1891)
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some success, various legal theories in seeking to recover from
payor banks for wrongful dishonor.
Assignment
In a number of cases brought prior to the enactment of the
NIL, the holder argued that a depositor, by drawing a check on a
bank account that had adequate funds to cover it, actually had
transferred the sum named on the check to the payee; therefore,

the payee could sue for and recover that sum from the bank if it
refused to pay upon presentment.'6 Most courts rejected this argument. The majority of courts treated a check as if it were an ordinary bill of exchange' 7 and, upon finding that the money deposited
in the bank became a part of the bank's general assets, viewed the
relationship between a drawer and a drawee as a creditor-debtor
relationship. 8 These courts thus held that the general rule forbidding a party's contractual responsibilities to be varied from those
contained in the original contract in a manner that would subject
him to the demands of several persons precluded recognition of
such an "assignment" in the absence of acceptance by the debtor
drawee.' 9 There was also concern that the bank would be obliged
(holder recovered bank funds from drawee bank on check assignment theory) with Bank of
the Republic v. Millard, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 152, 158 (1869) (deposited money is bank's property and bank is not obligated to holder) and Marine Bank v. Fulton Bank, 69 U.S. (2 Wall.)
252, 258 (1864) (customer established debtor-creditor relationship with bank, therefore,
check not an assignment).
16 See, e.g., Laclede Bank v. Schuler, 120 U.S. 511, 512 (1887) (plaintiff claimed check
was an assignment on an appropriation of funds for his benefit); Roberts v. Austin Corbin &
Co., 26 Iowa 315, 325-26 (1868) (holder permitted to maintain action against drawee provided the drawer has adequate funds, since drawer's promise to pay the payee accrues when
check is delivered); see also Munn v. Burch, 25 I11. 21, 26 (1860) (holder argued successfully
that check served to transfer title to funds in drawer's account to payee); Fogarties v. State
Bank, 46 S.C.L. (12 Rich.) 518, 525 (1860) (since presentment creates contract between
drawee and payee, payee has cause of action in case of wrongful dishonor).
17 See, e.g., Rogers v. Durant, 140 U.S. 298, 302-03 (1890); Moses v. Franklin Bank, 34
Md. 574, 579-80 (1871); see C. NORTON, supra note 8, § 152, at 586; 3 J. PomERoy, EQUrrY
JURISPRUDENCE § 1284, at 3089 (4th ed. 1918).
18 See, e.g., Bank of the Republic v. Millard, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 152, 155-57 (1869)
(bank is debtor of depositor customer); Chapman v. White, 6 N.Y. 412, 416-17 (1852) (deposited money becomes property of debtor-bank); Covert v. Rhodes, 48 Ohio St. 66, 68, 27
N.E. 94, 95 (1891) (bank's obligation on check is not as trustee but as debtor).
19 See, e.g., Bank of the Republic v. Millard, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 152, 156 (1869) (absence
of privity between holder and drawee makes action by holder for wrongful dishonor untenable); Cincinnati, H. & D.R.R. v. Metropolitan Nat'l Bank, 54 Ohio St. 60, 72, 42 N.E. 700,
702-03 (1896) (since bank's contractual agreement is with depositor, no duty to payee results
from the drafting of a check). The application of the general rule to cases involving wrongful
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to pay the check, even though the drawer had countermanded it
before it was presented and although other checks, drawn after it
was issued but before payment was demanded, had exhausted the
funds of the depositor. 0
Other courts, however, permitted a holder to recover from the
drawee bank, relying to some extent on an assignment theory. 21 In
Munn v. Burch,22 a leading case supporting this view, the Illinois
Supreme Court held:
[T]he check of a depositor upon his banker, delivered to another
for value, transfers to that other, the title to so much of the deposit as the check calls for . . . and when presented to the

banker, [the banker] becomes the holder of the money to the use
of the owner of the check, and is bound to account to him for that
amount, provided the party drawing the check has funds to that
amount on deposit, subject to his check at the time it is
presented."3
Several commentators agreed with the Munn holding that, once
presentment to the bank had been made, the holder could claim
that an appropriation of funds had occurred. 4 As one writer
explained:
It is true ...

that before demand for payment no assignment ex-

ists, no obligation has been created, no privity has grown up, and
dishonor to prevent drawees from being subjected to two claims arising from the same
transaction has been criticized as illogical and unwarranted. See 2 J. MORSE, TREATISE ON
THE LAW OF BANKS AND BAN 3NG § 507, at 1128 (6th ed. 1928).
20 Bank of the Republic v. Millard, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 152, 156 (1869); accord Satterwhite v. Melczer, 3 Ariz. 162, 167, 24 P. 184, 185 (1890) (bank not liable to payee, particularly in situations where it is unclear which of two payees has paramount right to funds);
Pullen v. Placer County Bank, 138 Cal. 169, 172-73, 71 P. 83, 84 (1902) (liability to payee
would place risks of countermand or insufficient funds on drawee bank).
21 See, e.g., Bank of Antigo v. Union Trust Co., 149 IlM. 343, 351-52, 36 N.E. 1029, 1031
(1894); National Bank of Am. v. Indiana Banking Co., 114 IMI.483, 491-92, 2 N.E. 401, 40405 (1885); Fonner v. Smith, 31 Neb. 107, 111, 47 N.W. 632, 632-33 (1891).
22 25 Ill. 21 (1860). The plaintiff in Munn accepted a check drawn by a third party on
Burch & Company, the defendant bank, in partial payment for a large quantity of wheat.
Id. at 22. The plaintiff deposited the check in his bank, and the bank presented it to Burch
for payment. Id. The check was accepted, since sufficient funds were on deposit at the time
it was presented. Id. Burch & Company, however, paid other outstanding checks written on
the account first, depleting the account to the extent that the first check was returned to the
plaintiff unpaid. Id. A suit was instituted against the drawee bank to compel payment on
the theory that the check operated as an assignment of the drawer's funds on deposit at the
time of presentment. Id.
23 Id. at 26 (emphasis added).
24 See, e.g., 3 J. DANIE, supra note 9, § 1843, at 1888; 2 J. MORSE, supra note 19, § 494,
at 112-13.
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the very right of the bank to pay may be taken away by any one
of a great number of occurrences. But the act of presentment and
demand, made before any one of these occurrences has taken
place, is the act which creates at once, by usage of business and
understanding of all concerned, the obligation, the privity, and
the appropriation, or at least the right to claim an
appropriation.2 5

Several courts found that the general rule prohibiting the assignment of a portion of the debt had no applicability to the situation where a bank is the drawee-debtor. Those courts recognized
that, by custom and by contract, the bank had agreed to pay the
funds to as many different people and in as many different portions as the customer should order by his written check.2 7 This was
distinguishable from the "ordinary" bill of exchange, in which the
debtor has agreed to pay only one person.2 8
Implied Promise/ThirdParty Beneficiary
Checkholders seeking to recover from drawee banks also argued that when the depositor deposited funds in his bank, an implied promise or agreement between the depositor and the bank
was made that benefited the checkholder.2 9 There was, however,
vigorous opposition to imposing any "implied duty" to
checkholders upon banks.3 0 A number of courts were particularly
concerned with the lack of privity between the holder and the
25 J. MoRsE, supra note 19, at 471 (1st ed. 1870).
26

See, e.g., Bank of Antigo v. Union Trust Co., 149 IlM. 343, 352, 36 N.E. 1029, 1031

(1894) (bank deposit exception widely affirmed by Illinois courts); Munn v. Burch, 25 Ill. 21,
24 (1860) (bank deposits are an exception to general rule prohibiting assignment of portions
of debt); Roberts v. Austin Corbin & Co., 26 Iowa 315, 324-25 (1868) (merchants', bankers',
and farmers' expectations of receiving payment on presentment have spawned the evolution
of the bank deposits exception).
27 See, e.g., Bank of Antigo v. Union Trust Co., 149 Ill. 343, 352, 36 N.E. 1029, 1031
(1894); Munn v. Burch, 25 Ill. 21, 24 (1860); Roberts v. Austin Corbin & Co., 26 Iowa 315,
324-25 (1868).
28 3 J. POMEROY, supra note 17, § 1284, at 3089-91 (jurisdictions holding that checks are
assignments of funds have distinguished checks from bills of exchange); see Roberts v. Austin Corbin & Co., 26 Iowa 315, 326 (1868) ("[tlhis doctrine that the payee or holder may
have his action against the drawee, is limited to cases of checks, and has no application...
to bills of exchange") (emphasis in original).
29 See infra note 35 and accompanying text.
20 See, e.g., Grammal v. Carmer, 55 Mich. 201, 203, 21 N.W. 418, 420 (1884); Aetna
Nat'l Bank v. Fourth Nat'l Bank, 46 N.Y. 82, 86 (1871); Commercial Nat'l Bank v. First
Nat'l Bank, 118 N.C. 783, 787, 24 S.E. 524, 524 (1896); The Liability of a Bank to the
Holder of a Check, Alb. L.J., July 26, 1873, at 50.
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bank.3 1 For example, the United States Supreme Court in Bank of
the Republic v.Millard3 2 observed:
On principle, there can be no foundation for an action on the part
of the holder, unless there is a privity of contract between him
and the bank. How can there be a privity when the bank owes no
duty and is under no obligation to the holder? The holder takes
the check on the credit of the drawer in the belief that he has the
funds to meet it, but in no sense can the bank be said to be connected with the transaction."
The Millard Court also was concerned that, since the drawer could
maintain an action for breach of contract, if the holder of the
check also were allowed to sue, then there could arise the anomalous situation of "a right of action upon one promise, for the
same
4
thing, existing in two distinct persons, at the same time."'
Many courts also rejected the argument that the holder was a
third party beneficiary, noting that in cases where a third party
beneficiary theory had been applied, either the third party was
designated at the time the contract was entered into, or an appropriation of the funds for that party's benefit was made at the time
of the contract.35 The courts were unwilling to find that an obligation as to amounts not specified or presently ascertainable would
attach in favor of future creditors who were unnamed and
unknown.6
'3 See, e.g., Laclede Bank v. Schuler, 120 U.S. 511, 514 (1887); First Nat'l Bank v.
Whitman, 94 U.S. 343, 344-45 (1876); Nat'l Bank of New Jersey v. Berrall, 70 N.J.L. 757,
759-60, 58 A. 189, 190 (1904).
32 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 152 (1869). In Millard, a creditor of the United States was given a
check drawn on the Bank of the Republic. Id. The check was honored by the bank on a
forged indorsement. Id. Upon proof of the forgery and recovery of the check, the creditor represented the check to the bank. Id. at 153. The bank refused to make payment, notwithstanding that it had sufficient funds on hand to cover the check. Id.
33 Id. at 156.
34 Id.; accord Carr v. National Sec. Bank, 107 Mass. 45, 49 (1871) (bank's promise to
honor checks of drawer does not render it liable to holder while still obligated to account to
drawer for funds paid); Aetna Nat'l Bank v. Fourth Nat'l Bank, 46 N.Y. 82, 86 (1871) (to
impose liability on bank for breach of deposit contract to both holder and drawer would
create anomaly in the law).
"ISee, e.g., Fourth St. Bank v. Yardley, 165 U.S. 634, 644 (1897) (if check is to be paid
out of specified fund, drawee with notice of this fact is liable to holder); Ballard v. Home
Nat'l Bank, 91 Kan. 91, 96, 136 P. 935, 936 (1913) (contract with bank that obviously is for
holders' benefit creates a right of action in holder against bank); People's Nat'l Bank v.
Swift, 134 Tenn. 175, 182, 183 S.W. 725, 727 (1916) (traditional rule not applicable when
parties arrange for appropriation of fund and inform bank of the arrangement).
36 See, eg., Harrison v. Wright, 100 Ind. 515, 538-39 (1884); Cincinnati, H. & D. R.R. v.
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A number of courts, however, did permit recovery under an
"implied promise" theory. 7 One writer explained:
[I]t is the universal understanding between banks and depositors, arising from the customs of trade, that the check of the latter is to be paid upon presentment ....

The drawer of the check

makes the deposit, and draws the check with this understanding.
The bank receives the money with the like understanding, and so
the holder receives the check. And the mutual understanding of
the parties, although they have not individually concerted together, creates an implied privity, and completes the contract between them. 8
Indeed, the Illinois court, in Munn v. Burch, 9 forcefully stated
that the banker agrees with "the whole world" that whoever becomes a holder would, upon presentation, be entitled to recover on
the check, so long as the drawer had sufficient funds on deposit. °
Courts adopting the implied promise theory rejected the lack of
privity argument, relying on the general principle that where one
person makes a promise to another for the benefit of a third, the
latter may maintain an action on it, though the consideration did
not move from him.41 These courts were not concerned that the
particular beneficiary was unknown to the promisor bank at the
time of the promise, since "privity" was created when the
checkholder presented the check for payment, and it was only at
Metropolitan Nat'l Bank, 54 Ohio St. 60, 69-70, 42 N.E. 700, 702-03 (1896).
17 See, e.g., Roberts v. Austin Corbin & Co., 26 Iowa 315, 325-26 (1868) (holder can
maintain action based on implied promise of party receiving deposits to pay them out on
receipt of depositor's checks);. Fonner v. Smith, 31 Neb. 107, 110, 47 N.W. 632, 632 (1891)
(when bank receives deposits it impliedly promises to pay depositor's checks to presenters);
Fogarties v. State Bank, 46 S.C.L. (12 Rich.) 518, 530 (1860) (accepting money and promising to disburse it as ordered creates contract that puts bank in privity with the party to
whom bank is ordered to make payment); Turner v. Hot Springs Nat'l Bank, 18 S.D. 498,
502, 101 N.W. 348, 349 (1904) (acceptance of most checks that pass in commerce based on
implied promise to pay promptly such amounts as depositor orders).
0 3 J. DANmL, supra note 9, § 1841, at 1885-86.
" 25 IMI.21 (1860).
" Id.
at 24-25; accord May v. Jones, 87 Iowa 188, 197-98, 54 N.W. 231, 234 (1893)
(delivery and intent give rise to right to enforce vesting of implied right in payee); Senter v.
Continental Bank, 7 Mo. App. 532, 534 (1877) (commercial necessities dictate need for implied right vesting in payee).
41 See, e.g., Roberts v. Austin Corbin & Co., 26 Iowa 315, 324-26 (1868) (delivery of
bank check carries with it a right of action against drawee bank); Fonner v. Smith, 31 Neb.
107, 111, 47 N.W. 632, 633 (1891) (party may sue on promise made to another for sufficient
consideration if it was made for party's use and benefit); Turner v. Hot Springs Nat'l Bank,
18 S.D. 498, 500, 101 N.W. 348, 350 (1904) (bank agrees that holder of check has right to
receive amount to which it is drawn if drawer has such amount on deposit).
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that point that the holder could sue the bank that wrongfully refused to honor the check.42
Finally, courts utilizing the implied promise theory recognized
that parties are often liable to more than one person for a single
wrongful act, and the fact that the bank may be liable to its depositor should not except the bank from performing its promise to the
checkholders. 43 These courts suggested that no problems would be
created by permitting a checkholder to recover on the instrument
while permitting the depositor to recover nominal or special damages for the breach."
Pre-NIL Analysis
The failure of some courts to distinguish between a check and
an ordinary bill of exchange resulted in this split of authority in
the courts. 45 The original bill of exchange was probably a letter of
credit from a merchant to his debtor, a merchant in another country, asking the debtor to pay the debt to a third person, who carried the letter and who happened to be travelling to where the
debtor resided.46 It was a convenient, inexpensive, and relatively
risk-free means of making payment. The holder of a bill sometimes
presented the bill to the party to whom it was addressed in order
to ascertain in advance whether the bill would be paid. This promise to pay was the origin of acceptance.47 Once accepted by the
debtor, the value of the debt was reduced to a certain amount, and
evidence of the original demand was unnecessary, since the bill af42 See, e.g., Roberts v. Austin Corbin & Co., 26 Iowa 315, 324-25 (1868); Fonner v.
Smith, 31 Neb. 107, 111, 47 N.W. 632, 633 (1891); Turner v. Hot Springs Nat'l Bank, 18 S.D.
498, 503-04, 101 N.W. 348, 350 (1904).
43 See, e.g., Roberts v. Austin Corbin & Co., 26 Iowa 315, 325 (1868); Turner v. Hot
Springs Nat'l Bank, 18 S.D. 498, 500, 101 N.W. 348, 349-50 (1904).
44 See, e.g., Roberts v. Austin Corbin & Co., 26 Iowa 315, 325 (1868).
41 Compare First Nat'l Bank v. Whitman, 94 U.S. 343, 345 (1876) (no right of action for
checkholder since checks are treated like bills of exchange for purposes of determining
payee's rights) and Moses v. President & Directors of the Franklin Bank, 34 Md. 575, 58082 (1871) (check, like a bill of exchange, need not be accepted by bank upon presentment)
with Munn v. Burch, 25 Ill.,21, 24 (1860) (check differs from typical creditor's order to pay
third party since, by longstanding custom, "they are received, and passed and deposited
with bankers as cash").
46 W. WAaD & H. HARFiELD, BANK CREnrrs AND ACCEPTANCES 9 (4th ed. 1958).
47 See Van Buskirk v. State Bank, 35 Colo. 142, 146, 83 P. 778, 779 (1905). For a discussion of the nature of acceptance regarding bills of exchange, see 2 J. DANmL, supra note 9, §
541, at 604-05.
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forded a clear title to the debt.48
In considering this type of bill of exchange, it was logical to
conclude that the drawee was not liable to the holder prior to acceptance. Though the drawee and drawer had a debtor-creditor relationship, the payee of the bill had no relationship with the
drawee. 49 Indeed, the drawee had never promised, expressly or implicitly, to pay the debt owed to the drawer to any third parties.
Courts, therefore, were understandably unwilling to permit the
drawer to divide up his demand against the debtor drawee and require the latter to pay it in parcels without the drawee's consent.
Once the drawee accepted the bill of exchange, however, the consent was given" and courts could find that "privity" had been established between the payee and the drawee, enabling the payee to
sue a drawee that failed to pay the bill.5 1 Conversely, without acceptance, and in the absence of special circumstances indicating
that an assignment had been made, the drawee could refuse to
pay. 2 This meant that the payee's only recourse was against the
drawer, the party primarily liable on the bill."
The better-reasoned cases recognized that a check is not an
ordinary bill of exchange. 5 Though a debtor-creditor relationship
48 1 J. DANIEL, supra note 9, § 2, at 3.

4' Dean v. De Soto Nat'l Bank, 97 Fla. 862, 866, 122 So. 105, 106 (1929) (absent acceptance of bill of exchange, drawee enters into no contractual relations with payee in respect to
it); Grammel v. Carmer, 55 Mich. 201, 205, 21 N.W. 418, 420 (1884) (until drawee is
presented with and accepts bill of exchange, he has no contractual relationship with payee).
50 Cox v. National Bank, 100 U.S. 704, 712 (1879); Swope v. Ross, 40 Pa. 186, 188
(1881).
1 See, e.g., Hoffman & Co. v. Bank of Milwaukee, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 181, 192 (1870)
(acceptance imparts an obligation on the part of the acceptor to pay a payee who has paid
value for the bill accepted); see C. NORTON, supra note 8, § 69, at 196; J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OP BxLLs AND EXCHANGE 131-32 (1843).
52 See, e.g., Grammel v. Carmer, 55 Mich. 201, 205 (1884); Clements v. Yeates, 69 Mo.
624, 625 (1879); Kimball v. Donald, 20 Mo. 577, 582 (1855).
" See, e.g., Watson v. Tarpley, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 517, 519 (1855) (upon presentment of
bill and drawee's subsequent refusal to accept, payee has right to immediate recourse
against drawer); Wood v. McMeans, 23 Tex. 481, 484 (1859) (where drawee refused to accept
draft, drawer immediately rendered liable). Since the payee has no right of action against
the drawee in the absence of his acceptance of the instrument, see Bull v. Bank of Kasson,
123 U.S. 105, 111 (1887), the only recourse for the payee would be an action against the
drawer.
' See, e.g., Munn v. Burch, 25 IlM.21, 24-25 (1860) (by custom, check is treated as
equivalent to cash because its issuance is based on bank's implied contract with depositor to
pay funds on deposit to holders); Roberts v. Austin Corbin & Co., 26 Iowa 315, 325-26
(1868) (doctrine that implied contract between bank and its depositor permits payee recovery does not apply to bills of exchange).
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exists between the drawee bank and its drawer-customer, there is
also a contractual relationship between the parties. In return for
the use of the drawer's funds, the bank agrees to allow the drawer
to write checks in such sums as he sees fit to numerous third parties who are unknown at the time the account is created.55 Thus,
the rule that a party could not assign a portion of the debt owed
would not seem to be applicable when the debtor is a bank. Nor
could a bank argue that its original contract was being varied or
that it should not be held liable to unknown future creditors for
unspecified amounts. In light of the foregoing, it is not surprising
that the majority of textbook writers who addressed this issue
prior to the NIL agreed that a checkholder should be able to sue a
bank for improperly dishonoring the check."'
THE UNIFORM NEGOTIABLE INSmuMNS LAW

Two sections of the NIL generally resolved this split in the
jurisdictions. Section 127 provided:
A bill of itself does not operate as an assignment of the funds in
the hands of the drawee available for the payment thereof, and
the drawee is not liable on the bill unless and until he accepts the
same.57
Similarly, section 189, which dealt specifically with checks,
provided:
A check of itself does not operate as an assignment of any part of
the funds to the credit of the drawer with the bank, and the bank
is not liable to the holder unless and until it accepts or certifies
the check.

8

These provisions rejected the argument that a check standing
" B. CLARK & A. SQUILLANTE, THE LAW OF BANK DEPosrrs, COLLECTIONS AND CREDr
CARDS 28 (1970). Clark states that "[the relationship between the drawee bank and its
customer as drawer of a check is primarily based on the deposit contract. The demand deposit account creates a debtor-creditor relationship ....

The demand account gives the

customer the right to order his bank to pay checks so long as funds are available ...... Id.
He does not, however, acknowledge that the holder has a legal right to sue the drawee on
the basis of the contract. Id. at 57. But see Note, The Holder of a Check as a Beneficiary of
a Third PartyBeneficiary Contract, 26 COLUM. L. Ray. 459, 459-64 (1926) (payee should be
treated as third party beneficiary of the deposit contract).
16See, e.g., 3 J. DANIEL, supra note 9, §§ 1837-1842; see H. VAN SCHAACK, Tim LAW OF
BANK CHECKs IN THE UNITED STATES 214 (2d ed. 1892).
57

UNrF. NEGOTIABLE INSTRumENTs LAW

58 Id. § 189.

§

127 (1896) (superceded 1952).
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alone could operate as an assignment. Moreover, while section 127
governing bills of exchange provided that until acceptance the
drawee was "not liable on the bill," section 189, dealing with
checks, contained more sweeping language, providing that until acceptance the bank was "not liable to the holder."5' 9 As a result,
cases that had previously permitted holders to proceed on an assignment or implied contract theory were generally overruled."0
Finding their contract actions barred by the NIL, holders in a
number of cases based their actions against the drawee in tort, arguing that section 189 was inapplicable to tort claims. Such actions
for "negligence,' ''conversion," or "malicious interference with
business transactions" failed, because courts concluded that, without privity, the banks owed no legal duty to the checkholders 1
Courts described the actions as "illogical, '62 or as "thinly veiled
attempts to thwart the intended effect of [the] statute."63 In rejecting the contention that the drawee's refusal to honor a check
might constitute a tortious interference with a business transaction, one court explained:
Were this cause of action in tort allowed to proceed in spite of
this statute the effect would be to completely negate the purpose
and effect of this statute. It is readily apparent that any refusal to
honor a check by a bank, precisely the activity authorized by this
statute, . . . could6 4also be said to constitute an interference with
business relations.
Moreover, while one court has suggested that a holder might
be able to recover from a bank that had refused payment intentionally in order to defraud the holder,6 5 other courts have indiSee Aigler, supra note 1, at 869-70, 884.
11 See Leach v. Mechanics' Say. Bank, 202 Iowa 899, 905, 211 N.W. 506, 508 (1926);
First Nat'l Bank v. Hargis Commercial Bank & Trust Co., 170 Ky. 690, 693, 186 S.W. 471,
472 (1916).
"' See, e.g., Elmore v. Palmer First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 221 So. 2d 164, 167 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1969); First Nat'l Bank v. Hargis Commercial Bank & Trust Co., 170 Ky. 690,
693, 186 S.W. 471, 472 (1916); see also General Am. Life Ins. Co. v. Stadiem, 223 N.C. 49,
53, 25 S.E.2d 202, 205 (1943) (claim for wrongful and negligent failure to pay check dismissed on ground that no action at law was available, since bank was not liable to holder
until it accepted check).
"' First Nat'l Bank v. Hargis Commercial Bank & Trust Co., 170 Ky. 690, 693, 186 S.W.
471, 472 (1916).
"' Elmore v. Palmer First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 221 So. 2d 164, 166 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1969).
Id. at 167.
Berkoff v. Klein, 81 N.Y.S.2d 244, 245 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 1948) (dictum). The
19
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cated that a bank's reason for wrongfully dishonoring the check
simply made no difference to the outcome of the action.66 For example, in a case in which a holder alleged that a bank's wrongful
refusal to pay a check was based upon a mistake of fact,67 Judge
Learned Hand stated:
The mistake was quite irrelevant. Had the ... [b]ank refused to

honor the check willfully and for no reason whatever, no liability
would have attached to it; the payee can sue only the drawer, and
the drawer must look to the drawee.6 8
It is doubtful that section 189 was intended to cover completely the subject of the liability of a bank to the holder of a
check for wrongful dishonor.69 The provision that "the bank is not
liable to the holder" immediately followed the declaration that "a
check of itself does not operate as an assignment.

70

Thus, while

the section made clear that a bank normally was not liable to a
holder as an assignee,1 it was not so clear that liability under
some other theory was prohibited.7 2 However, in view of the expansive language contained in section 189, as compared to section 127,
it is not surprising that section 189 was interpreted as a broad prohibition.7 3 A typical interpretation of these sections is illustrated
Berkoff court observed: "if the bank intentionally refused payment because there were insufficient funds in the bank... that would be deception, an unlawful act, and if it contained all of the elements of fraud, it could be the basis of a scheme to defraud the plaintiff." Id.
" See, e.g., South Carolina Nat'l Bank v. McCandless, 44 F.2d 111, 113 (4th Cir. 1930);
Sneider v. Bank of Italy, 184 Cal. 595, 599, 194 P. 1021, 1023 (1920); Columbia-Knickerbocker Trust Co. v. Miller, 215 N.Y. 191, 196, 109 N.E. 179, 180 (1915).
"Eastman Kodak Co. v. National Park Bank, 231 F. 320, 325 (S.D.N.Y. 1916), aff'd,
247 F. 1002 (2d Cir. 1917). In Eastman Kodak, a check had been recorded on the books of
the drawee bank, but had gone unpaid by mistake. 231 F. at 322. When the check was
presented again on the following day, the drawee bank refused to honor it since the bank
mistakenly believed it had received no instructions to pay. Id.
"Id. at 325.
69See State v. First Nat'l Bank, 38 N.M. 225, 232, 30 P.2d 728, 732 (1934) ("nothing in
the Negotiable Instruments Law would deny [payee the] right" to recover for conversion of
funds); Aigler, supra note 1, at 884 (NIL only was intended to establish that drawee bank
was not to be considered liable to holder as assignee based upon existence of check alone).
But see Elyria Say. & Banking Co. v. Walker Bin Co., 92 Ohio St. 406, 414, 111 N.E. 147,
149 (1915) (section 189 "intended to cover the liability of a bank to the holder of a check").
70 UNIF. NEGOTIABLE NSTRuMAENTs LAw § 189 (1896) (superceded 1952); see Aigler,
supra note 1, at 883-84.
71 Aigler, supra note 1, at 884.
72See Note, supra note 55, at 464 (NIL does not appear "to unduly restrict third party
beneficiary theory" which would permit payee recovery).
71 Aigler, supra note 1, at 884.
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by the following observation by one commentator:
the fact remains . . .that when the situation regarding bills of

exchange generally was being provided for the language chosen
was-"and the drawee is not liable on the bill unless and until he
accepts the same."

. .

. Under ... section [127] a drawee might

well be held upon a tort liability. If the framers of the act did not
intend a difference in result under
the two sections, why did they
74
use strikingly varying language?

Moreover, apart from the statute, there were problems with
both the third party beneficiary and tort theories of recovery.
While it had become well-settled that a beneficiary need not be
ascertained at the time the promise was made, 75 and that the
amount need not be certain at that time, 6 other problems with
viewing a holder as a third party beneficiary persisted. There was
concern that a bank pays checks in the order presented, not drawn,
without inquiry into whether more checks have been drawn than
there are funds available to pay them.17 In addition, a bank is subject to its customer's stop payment order until the check is
presented and paid or accepted. While it was suggested that these
incidents could be incorporated into the bank's promise in the
form of a condition precedent to recovery on that promise without
negating the idea of a third party contract,7" Williston observed
that "[t]hese considerations largely explain the reluctance of the
majority of jurisdictions to regard the payee or holder of a check as
' '7
a third party beneficiary. 1

Regarding recovery based on tort theory, the notion that there
could be no liability on the part of a contracting party to one with
whom he was not in "privity" was firmly entrenched in this country.80 Indeed, Justice Cardozo's landmark opinion of MacPherson
" See id. at 884 n.96 (citations omitted) (emphasis in original).
75See, e.g., Ohio Casualty Ins. Co. v. Beckwith, 74 F.2d 75, 78 (5th Cir. 1935); Whitehead v. Burgess, 61 N.J.L. 75, 77, 38 A. 802, 802 (1897); Note, supra note 55, at 460.
" See Note, supra note 55, at 460.
77 2 S.WILISTON, A TREATSE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 389, at 1054 (3d ed. 1959).
78

See, e.g., Note, supra note 55, at 460.

10 2 S. WILLISTON, supra note 77, § 389, at 1054-55.
80 See, e.g., Birmingham Chero-Cola Bottling Co. v. Clark, 205 Ala. 678, 680, 89 So. 64,
65 (1921); Tompkins v. Quaker Oats Co., 239 Mass. 147, 149, 131 N.E. 456, 456 (1921);
Windram Mfg. Co. v. Boston Blacking Co., 239 Mass. 123, 124-25, 131 N.E. 454, 455 (1921);
Burkett v. Studebaker Bros. Mfg., 126 Tenn. 467, 472, 150 S.W. 421, 422 (1912).
The concept of privity had its origins in the 19th-century English case of Winterbottom
v. Wright, 152 Eng. Rep. 402 (1842). In Winterbottom, the defendant was a manufacturer of
mail coaches, and had sold a coach to the Postmaster-General. Id. The plaintiff, an em-
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v. Buick Co."' was not decided until 1916.82 Since MacPherson,significant inroads have been made in recognizing the rights of parties
injured by the negligence of others with whom there is no privity.8 3
It certainly is not surprising, however, that courts in the early
1900's could find no "legal duty" owed by the bank to a
checkholder when no contractual relationship existed between
them.
THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE

A checkholder seeking to recover from a drawee bank for its
refusal to pay a check may run into several obstacles under various
provisions of the Code. Section 4-402 provides that "[a] payor
bank is liable to its customer for damages proximately caused by
the wrongful dishonor of an item."8' Relying upon this provision,
several courts have concluded that the only party having a cause of
action for wrongful dishonor under the UCC is the customer of the
drawee bank.8 5 Since a payee is not generally a "customer," 8 6
courts have held that he has no action against the bank.87 In addition, section 3-401(1) states that "[n]o person is liable on an inployee of the Postmaster, was injured when thrown from the coach as the result of an accident caused by a latent defect in one of the wheels. Id. at 403. In holding for the defendant,
Lord Abinger declared that unless liability on such contracts is confined "to the parties who
entered into them, the most absurd and outrageous consequences, to which [there is] no
limit, would ensue." Id. at 405. The rule enunciated in Winterbottom was, for the most part,
adopted by American courts, and was applied in most cases, with the exception of those
where liability resulted from the manufacture of inherently dangerous goods, see, e.g.,
Tompkins v. Quaker Oats Co., 239 Mass. 147, 149, 131 N.E. 456, 457 (1921), or from fraud,
see, e.g., Burkett v. Studebaker Bros. Mfg., 126 Tenn. 467, 472, 150 S.W. 421, 422 (1912).
:1217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916).
82 Id. The MacPherson rule permitted persons to recover from the manufacturer, "irrespective of privity," for injuries suffered from defects resulting from the use of a product of
a kind reasonably certain to be dangerous if negligently made. Id. at 389, 111 N.E. at 1053.
The Court thus went beyond the narrow limits of the privity doctrine, under which third
parties were permitted to recover only when the product or act in question is an element of
destruction in its normal use or operation. Id.
83 See infra text accompanying notes 151-87.
84 U.C.C. § 4-402 (1978) (emphasis added).
85See, e.g., Bon Bon Prods., Ltd. v. Xanadu Prods., Inc., 32 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 253, 257 (D. Mass. 1981); Steinbrecher v. Fairfield County Trust Co., 5 Conn. Cir. Ct.
393, 395, 255 A.2d 138, 139 (1968).
S8 See Steinbrecher v. Fairfield County Trust Co., 5 Conn. Cir. Ct. 393, 395, 255 A.2d
138, 139 (1968) (customer defined as depositor, not as payee). For a discussion of the term
"customer" under the UCC, see supra note 5.
87See, e.g., Southeastern Pipeline Serv., Inc. v. Citizens & S. Bank, 617 F.2d 67, 69 (5th
Cir. 1980); Bon Bon Prods. v. Xanadu Prods., 32 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 253, 257 (D.
Mass. 1981); see also H. BAnEY, BRADY ON BANK CHECKS § 18.8-.9 (5th ed. Supp. 1983).
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strument unless his signature appears thereon." 88 Thus, it has been
held that a drawee cannot be liable on the instrument unless he
accepts it.89
Other courts have relied on section 3-409 of the Code to deny
a checkholder any cause of action for the drawee bank's refusal to
pay the check. Section 3-409, a revised version of section 189 of the
NIL, provides:
(1) A check or other draft does not of itself operate as an assignment of any funds in the hands of the drawee available for its
payment, and the drawee is not liable on the instrument until he
accepts it.
(2) Nothing in this section shall affect any liability in contract,
tort or otherwise arising from any letter of credit or other obligation or representation which is not an acceptance. 90
Citing this provision, courts have concluded that, prior to acceptance, the bank has no legal obligation to honor the check. 1
92
For example, in Stewart v. Citizens & Southern National Bank,
the holder of a check properly presented the check to the drawee
bank's branch manager, who flatly refused to cash the check, even
though he stated that there were sufficient funds in the drawee's
account."' The checkholder sued the bank and its branch manager
for their refusal to cash a valid check drawn against a solvent account on deposit in the bank. The appellate court affirmed the
trial court's dismissal of the checkholder's action, and agreed with
the defendants that, pursuant to section 3-409 of the Code, the
defendants owed no duty to the plaintiff holder.94 The court thus
concluded that the plaintiff's remedy "was 'against the drawers
and indorsers,' not the defendant bank and its agent, neither of
U.C.C. § 3-401(1) (1978).
8 See, e.g., Goldberg v. Lowe, 509 F. Supp. 412, 422 (N.D. Miss. 1981) (under § 3-401,
signature on note creates personal liability); Bank of Waverly v. City Bank & Trust Co., 600
S.W.2d 630, 632 (Mo. Ct. App. 1980) (dictum) (drawee not liable on instrument until his
signature appears thereon).
90 U.C.C. § 3-409 (1978).
91 See, e.g., Sabin Meyer Regional Sales Corp. v. Citizens Bank, 502 F. Supp. 557, 558
(N.D. Ga. 1980); First City Nat'l Bank v. Long-Lewis Hardware Co., 363 So. 2d 762, 765
(Ala. Civ. App. 1977), rev'd on other grounds, 363 So. 2d 770 (Ala. 1978); Barnett Bank v.
Capital City First Nat'l Bank, 348 So. 2d 643, 644 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1977); Brown v. South
Shore Nat'l Bank, 1 Ill.
App. 3d 136, -, 273 N.E.2d 671, 673 (1971); Willow City Farmers
Elevator v. Vogel, Vogel, Brantner & Kelly, 268 N.W.2d 762, 766 (N.D. 1978) (dictum).
12 138 Ga. App. 209, 225 S.E.2d 761 (1976).
93 Id. at 211, 225 S.E.2d at 762.
Id. at 210-11, 225 S.E.2d at 762-63.
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whom owed him a duty.

'95

Despite the case authority suggesting otherwise, it is not clear
that the Code addresses the issue of a bank's liability to a
checkholder, apart from the instrument, when it wrongfully refuses to pay a check even though sufficient funds are on hand. It is
clear that under the UCC a drawee bank is not liable on the instrument until acceptance.96 But what if a checkholder does not sue on
the instrument, and instead bases his action against the drawee
upon a third party beneficiary theory or a tort theory? Does the
Code preclude such an action?
There is a reasonable argument that section 4-402, which provides that a bank is liable to its customer for wrongful dishonor,
prohibits an action by anyone other than a customer for a bank's
wrongful refusal to pay a check. This appears to be the way several
courts recently have interpreted the provision. On the other
hand, section 4-402 might merely be intended to state a damages
rule for wrongful dishonor of checks when the customer sues the
drawee, the most common situation, without considering whether a
duty might be owed to noncustomers. Prior to the Code, courts
made a distinction in the measure of damages sustained by a depositor whose check was dishonored according to whether the depositor was a "trader" or a "nontrader."95 There was also some
confusion over whether the wrongful dishonor of a check could be
considered the "proximate cause" of the arrest and prosecution of
5 Id. at 211, 225 S.E.2d at 762 (citation omitted). In addition to the three Code provisions previously mentioned, sections 3-104 and 3-507 have been brought into play by courts
contending that a holder may not maintain a cause of action for wrongful dishonor. See, e.g.,
Central Bank Nat'l Ass'n v. Federal Home Loan Bank, 430 F. Supp. 1080, 1084 (N.D. Cal.
1977) (construing section 3-104's definition of "check"), vacated, 620 F.2d 309 (9th Cir.
1980); Stewart, 138 Ga. App. at 211, 225 S.E.2d at 762 (interpreting section 3-507 definition
of "dishonor"). As these provisions are merely definitional, they will not be analyzed in this
Article.
" See U.C.C. § 3-409(1) (1978); supra note 90 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., Goldberg v. Lowe, 509 F. Supp. 412, 422 (N.D. Miss. 1981).
,8See, e.g., Third Nat'l Bank v. Ober, 178 F. 678, 678-80 (8th Cir. 1910); First Nat'l
Bank v. N.R. McFall & Co., 144 Ark. 149, 151, 222 S.W. 40, 41 (1920). There is a presumption that substantial damages have been sustained when a check drawn by a merchant or
trader is wrongfully dishonored. Ober, 178 F. at 678-80. The rational for this rule is that
wrongful dishonor reflects adversely upon the merchant's credit rating, and therefore constitutes a slander. McFall, 144 Ark. at 151, 222 S.W.2d at 41; see also Svendsen v. State Bank,
64 Minn. 40, 42, 65 N.W. 1086, 1087 (1896) (failure to honor merchant's check imputes
insolvency); J.M. James Co. v. Continental Nat'l Bank, 105 Tenn. 1, 5, 58 S.W. 261, 264
(1900) (rejection by bank of merchant's check injures his business standing); Browning v.
Bank of Vernal, 60 Utah 197, 199, 207 P. 462, 464 (1922) (failure of bank to pay on checks
deposited by merchant entitles depositor to recover without proof of actual damages).
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the customer.9 9 It may be that the drafters of section 4-402 merely
wanted to settle issues. 10 0 It is likely, however, that little thought
was given by the drafters of the Code to actions by noncustomers,
since pre-Code notions concerning the necessity of privity of contract had led courts to find no duty owing from the bank to anyone
other than the drawer, the party with whom it had a contract. 10 1 In
addition, under pre-Code law the category of protected beneficiaries of third party beneficiary contracts was still rather limited.102 Therefore, the effect of pre-Code law was to make it very
difficult for anyone but the customer to recover from a bank for
wrongful refusal to honor a check. 03
11 Compare Weaver v. Bank of Am. Nat'l Trust & Say. Ass'n, 59 Cal. 2d 428, 431, 380
P.2d 644, 651, 30 Cal. Rptr. 4, 9 (1963) (bank's failure to honor check had sufficient causal
connection to subsequent arrest of plaintiff) and Collins v. City Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 131
Conn. 167, 169, 38 A.2d 582, 584 (1944) (jury reasonably could find proximate cause) with
Waggoner v. Bank of Bernie, 220 Mo. App. 165, 167, 281 S.W. 130, 132 (1926) (arrest not
expected to follow wrongful dishonor when investigation would disclose that a mistake had
been made) and Western Nat'l Bank v. White, 62 Tex. Civ. App. 374, 376, 131 S.W. 828, 830
(1910) (appellant could not reasonably have contemplated that arrest would result from
wrongful dishonor of check).
10 See U.C.C. § 4-402 official comment 3 (1978) (repudiating cases allowing substantial
damages to merchants and traders without actual proof); id. official comment 5 (determinations that wrongful dishonor of check is not the proximate cause of customer's arrest are
questions of fact for the jury); see also Wrongful Dishonorof a Check: Payor Bank's Liability Under Section 4-402, 11 B.C. INDUS. & COM. L. REV. 116, 121-27 (1969) (objective of
section 4-402 was to provide clear standards for awarding damages).
101 See supra note 80 and accompanying text.
102 For a discussion of the development of the law of third party beneficiaries prior to
the UCC, see infra notes 116-33 and accompanying text.
103 See, e.g., Bank of the Republic v. Millard, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 152, 156 (1869) (holder
of check has no foundation for an action against drawee bank absent privity of contract);
Southern Trust Co. v. American Bank of Commerce & Trust Co., 148 Ark. 283, 284, 229
S.W. 1026, 1027 (1921) (payee of unaccepted check has no action against drawee bank); cf.
Leary v. Citizens & Mfrs. Nat'l Bank, 123 Conn. 475, 477, 23 A.2d 863, 865 (1942) (contract
between bank and depositor does not benefit every checkholder by implication of law).
Under pre-Code law, noncustomers were permitted to recover from the bank if they were
"directly defamed." See, e.g., Macrum v. Security Trust & Say. Co., 221 Ala. 419, 423, 129
So. 74, 77 (1930). In Macrum, the plaintiff was the manager of a company that had an
account with the defendant bank. Id. at 420, 129 So. at 75. The check the plaintiff issued in
his company's name was wrongfully dishonored by the bank. Id. The court allowed the
plaintiff to recover since he personally was affected by the imputation of lax business practices. Id. at 424, 129 So. at 78. The court observed:
The act of giving a worthless check, as affects its morals, was that of plaintiff
personally. The conduct of the bank could be construed as a claim that plaintiff in
a'representative or official capacity had thus drawn a check of the depositor which
had no funds subject to it, and was therefore an act of dishonesty and bad faith on
his part, as an individual. If this is a defamation by conduct of the depositor, the
jury could infer that it was such of plaintiff also.
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Since the enactment of the Code, however, there have been
some significant legal developments in these areas. As Professors
Murphy and Speidel recently noted:
One of the most dramatic legal developments in recent decades
has involved the enlargement of the rights of third parties not in
"privity" with the defendant. One facet is the growing enlargement of the category of protected beneficiaries of third party beneficiary contracts. Even more spectacular has been the expansion
of tort recovery by third persons ....

In the area of contracted-

for services there has been scant recognition of strict liability to
third persons, but there has been a pronounced extension of liability predicated upon the contractor's negligence in performing
promised service.Y04
Thus, while section 4-402 states a damages rule for those potential
plaintiffs under the law as it existed when that section was first
drafted, it is unlikely that the drafters intended to limit forever
the category of persons who might recover from a bank for wrongful dishonor of a check to those permitted such a recovery under
pre-Code law.
Nor does section 3-409 necessarily prohibit a checkholder from
recovering from a bank for wrongful refusal to pay a check. This
section simply states that a check, of itself, does not operate as an
assignment, and that the drawee is not liable on the instrument
until he accepts it. 10 5 Thus, in the absence of special circum-

stances, the payee has no right to the funds on deposit upon the
mere issuance of the check.106 In the typical situation where a
check is dishonored because of insufficient funds on deposit at the
time of presentment, the checkholder has no action against the
bank. 107 A payee who takes a check is relying on the credit of the

drawer, and must look to him if the check is dishonored because of
insufficient funds.108 While the payee assumes the risk that the
Id. at 424, 129 So. at 78.
104 E. MuRPHY & R. SPEmFL, STUiEs iN CoNmACT LAW 1380 (2d ed. 1977) (citations

omitted).

105 U.C.C. § 3-409(1) (1978).

101 See, e.g., Port City State Bank v. American Nat'l Bank, 486 F.2d 196, 201 (10th Cir.
1973); Sabin Meyer Regional Sales Corp. v. Citizens Bank, 502 F. Supp. 557, 559 (N.D. Ga.
1980); Steinbrecher v. Fairfield County Trust Co., 5 Conn. Cir. Ct. 393, 397, 255 A.2d 138,

142 (1968).
107 See H. BAILEY, supra note 87, § 18.5.

101 See, e.g., Bank of Wyandotte v. Woodrow, 394 F. Supp. 550, 555 (W.D. Mo. 1975)
(drawer liable on check upon dishonor); Bank of Venice v. Clapp, 17 Cal. App. 657, 658, 121

ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 58:318

drawer may have insufficient funds in its account to cover the
check, it is unlikely that section 3-409 was intended to require him
to assume the risk that the drawee bank might negligently or even
willfully fail to honor the check when sufficient funds are on hand.
Section 3-409(2) specifically provides that the section was not
intended to affect liability "in contract, tort or otherwise arising
[apart from the instrument] from any letter of credit or other obligation or representation which is not an acceptance." 10 9 In addition, the official comments to section 3-409 state that "[tihe section leaves unaffected any liability of any kind apart from the
instrument,"11 0 and that while the drawee is not liable on the instrument until he accepts, "he remains subject to any other liability to the holder.""' The official comments also contain illustrations of situations where a bank may be liable to a holder apart
from the instrument. For example, a bank may be liable in tort for
representations made, or may be liable to the holder for breach of
the terms of a letter of credit." 2 The official comment also makes
reference to section 4-302, and notes that a bank may be liable to
the holder for late return of an item." 3 Although no specific mention is made of possible liability for simple wrongful refusal to pay
a check, there is nothing to indicate that the illustrations found in
the official comment were intended to be exhaustive. Indeed, as
noted above, the official comment specifically provides that the
section does not affect "any liability of any kind apart from the
4
instrument.""1

A similar analysis may be used to dispel the notion that section 3-401(1) precludes an action by a payee to recover for the
P. 298, 298-99 (Dist. Ct. App. 1911) (fact that check is issued implies promise by drawer to
pay face amount if bank does not); Duncan v. Baskin, 8 Mich. App. 509, 511, 154 N.W.2d
617, 619 (1967) (drawer promises payment of check upon dishonor and notice thereof).
109 U.C.C. § 3-409(2) (1978).
110 Id. official comment 3.
"I Id. official comment 2.
112 See id.; see also North Valley Bank v. National Bank, 437 F. Supp. 70, 74 (N.D. Ill.
1977) (bank's oral representation that draft would be honored may constitute a waiver or
create an estoppel).
"I See U.C.C. § 3-409 official comment 2 (1978); see also Dozier v. First Ala. Bank, 363
So. 2d 781, 783 (Ala. Civ. App. 1978) (retaining check past midnight deadline precludes
bank from dishonoring check); Rock Island Auction Sales, Inc. v. Empire Packing Co., 32 M1.
2d 269, 271, 272, 204 N.E.2d 721, 722, 723 (1965) (payor bank accountable for amount of
check not returned until after midnight deadline); Fromer Distribs., Inc. v. Bankers Trust
Co., 36 App. Div. 2d 840, 840, 321 N.Y.S.2d 428, 430 (2d Dep't 1971) (mem.) (failure to
honor check before midnight deadline constitutes final payment).
114 See U.C.C. § 3-409 official comment 3 (1978) (emphasis added).
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wrongful dishonor of a check. The official comment to section 3401 states that "[n]othing in this section is intended to prevent
any liability arising apart from the instrument" and provides illustrations of potential causes of action similar to those given in the
commentary on section 3-409.115 In short, the Code does not pro-

hibit a checkholder from proceeding against a bank for wrongful
refusal to pay a check. Moreover, recent developments in contract
and tort law suggest several theories under which a checkholder
might base a cause of action.
CHECKHOLDERS AS BENEFICIARIES OF THE DRAWER'S CONTRACT
WITH THE DRAWEE

Traditionally, one not a party to an agreement encountered
problems when he attempted to enforce it or sought a remedy for
its breach, because he was not privy to the agreement116 and had
not contributed any consideration to the primary exchange. 1
Gradually, courts have modified their views, and have concluded
that beneficiary rights are dependent neither upon privity of contract118 nor upon furnishing any part of the consideration.11
Courts now recognize that certain third parties have independent
rights in some contracts, although there still is some confusion regarding the circumstances under which third party beneficiaries
acquire contract rights. 120
See id. § 3-401 official comments 1-2.
118

See, e.g., Mellen v. Whipple, 67 Mass. (1 Gray) 317, 324 (1854) (breach of contract

action by third party fails for lack of privity). But see Lawrence v. Fox, 20 N.Y. 268, 274
(1859) (one not a party to agreement may enforce it against promisor if contract made for
his benefit); Brill v. Brill, 282 Pa. 276, 278, 127 A. 840, 842 (1925) (third party has action on
contract if made primarily for his benefit). See generally 4 A. CORmN, CORBNm ON CONTRACTS
§ 778, at 28-31 (1951) (modern analysis of privity concept).
117 See 2 S. WILLISTON, supra note 77, § 354.
1'8 See, e.g., Calhoun v. Downs, 211 Cal. 766, 768, 297 P. 548, 550 (1931) (one can recover on contract made for his benefit although not a party thereto); Fleming v. Dillon, 370
Ill. 325, 329, 18 N.E.2d 910, 914 (1938) (third party can enforce agreement made for his
benefit); La Mourea v. Rhude, 209 Minn. 53, 56, 295 N.W. 304, 307 (1940) (right of third
party beneficiary to recover on contract suffices to give rise to privity). See generally E.
FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS § 10.2-.4, at 712-34 (1982) (history of development of third party
beneficiary law).
119 See, e.g., Massengale v. Transitron Elec. Corp., 358 F.2d 83, 88 (1st Cir. 1967); Fleming v. Dillon, 370 M11.325, 329, 18 N.E.2d 910, 914 (1938); Burns v. Washington Say., 251
Miss. 789, 791, 171 So. 2d 322, 324 (1965); see also E. FARNSWORTH, supra note 118, § 10.2,
at 714-17 (requirement that promisee furnish consideration has been repudiated in the
United States).
110 See infra notes 142-50 and accompanying text.
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In the early stages of the development of third party beneficiary law, courts often spoke of an "intent" to benefit the third
party. 121 As Professor Corbin explained:
In order that a third party may sue upon a contract made by
others he must show that he was intended by them to have an
enforceable right or at least that the performance of the contract
must necessarily be of benefit to him and such benefit must have
been within
the contemplation and purpose of the contracting
122
parties.

It was generally concluded that the promisee's intent to benefit a
third party was the only concern, and that the purpose and motives of the promisor could be disregarded, 123 at least so long as the
promisor had reason to know "that such benefit was contemplated
by the promisee as one of the motivating causes of his making the
24
contract.'
The first Restatement of Contracts classifies third party beneficiaries as either donee or creditor beneficiaries. 2 5 A third party is
121 See, e.g., Austin v. Seligman, 18 F. 519, 522 (S.D.N.Y. 1883); Simson v. Brown, 68
N.Y. 355, 361-62 (1877); Union Say. & Loan Co. v. Cook, 127 Ohio St. 26, 29, 186 N.E. 728,
731 (1933). See generally Note, Third PartyBeneficiaries and the Restatement (Second) of
Contracts, 67 CORNELL L.J. 880, 881 (1982) (during development of third party beneficiary
law, courts developed concept of "intent").
122 Corbin, Contracts for the Benefit of Third Persons, 27 YALE L.J. 1008, 1017 (1918)
(footnote omitted).
12 See, e.g., Hamill v. Maryland Casualty Co., 209 F.2d 338, 341 (10th Cir. 1954) (mutual intent to benefit the bond company was not required for its suit on construction contract); McCulloch v. Canadian Pac. Ry., 53 F. Supp. 534, 542 (D. Minn. 1943) (intent of
promisee was such that promisor should be bound to perform for third party); G. GRsioRz,
CONTRACTS 389 (rev. ed. 1965) (promisor's intention as to third party is insignificant); 2 S.
WLLISTON, supra note 77, § 356A, at 835-36 (intent of promisee is determinative because
promisee supplies the consideration); Note, The Third PartyBeneficiary Concept: A Proposal, 57 COLUM. L. REv. 406, 409 (1957) (general rule that intention of promisee is controlling). But see Spires v. Hanover Fire Ins. Co., 364 Pa. 52, 54, 70 A.2d 828, 830-31 (1950)
(both parties must intend third party to benefit for that party to recover on contract), overruled, 459 A.2d 744 (Pa. 1983); Comment, Barriers to Recovery in Pennsylvania Third
Party Beneficiary Law, 82 DICK. L. REv. 143, 158-61 (1977) (both the promisee and the
promisor must intend to confer a benefit on the third party).
12 Corbin, Third Partiesas Beneficiaries of Contractors'Surety Bonds, 38 YALE L.J. 1,
7 (1928) [hereinafter cited as Corbin, Third Parties as Beneficiaries]; see also Lucas v.
Hanem, 56 Cal. 2d 583, 587, 364 P.2d 685, 689, 15 Cal. Rptr. 821, 825 (1961) (promisor must
have understanding that promisee has intent to benefit third party), cert. denied, 368 U.S.
987 (1962); Peters Grazing Ass'n v. Legerski, 544 P.2d 449, 458 (Wyo. 1975) (promisor must
have understood that promisee intended to benefit third party).
125 RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS §

133 (1932). Section 133 of the first Restatement re-

flected an acceptance of the principle that two contracting parties may create legally enforceable rights in a third party for the latter's benefit. Id. Following the decision of Law-
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a donee beneficiary if "the purpose of the promisee in obtaining
the promise . . .is to make a gift to the beneficiary or to confer
upon him a right against the promisor to some performance
neither due nor supposed or asserted to be due from the promisee
to the beneficiary .
."16 Conversely, a third party is a creditor
*..
beneficiary "if no purpose to make a gift appears. . . and performance of the promise will satisfy an actual or supposed or asserted
duty of the promisee to the beneficiary .... - A third party not
falling within one of these categories is an "incidental beneficiary,"' 2 8 and has no rights under the contract.129 While this was
rence v. Fox, 20 N.Y. 268 (1859), the concept of the third party beneficiary gained increasing
recognition. See, e.g., Edwards v. Commissioner, 102 F.2d 757, 759 (10th Cir. 1939); American Exch. Nat. Bank v. Northern Pac. R.R. Co., 76 F. 130, 130 (D. Wash. 1896). Such recognition of third party rights, however, was not a universal trend. See Note, Third Party
Beneficiaries and the Intention Standard:A Search for Rational ContractDecision-Making, 54 VA. L. REv. 1166, 1167 n.8 (1968); see also United States ex rel. Midland Loan Fin.
Co. v. National Sur. Corp., 103 F.2d 450, 451-52 (8th Cir. 1939) (third party generally cannot
sue for breach in the absence of an enabling statute), aff'd, 309 U.S. 165 (1940); Hudson v.
Moonier, 102 F.2d 96, 98 (8th Cir.) (Missouri law does not permit third party action on
contract), cert. denied, 307 U.S. 639 (1939). In an attempt to supply a theoretical basis for
third party contractual recovery, and to eliminate confusion generated by judicial attempts
to use legal fictions to alleviate injustices resulting from application of the privity requirement, the Restatement of Contracts created two categories of third party beneficiaries
within which to vest enforceable contractual rights-donee and creditor beneficiaries. RESTATEmENT OF CONTRACTS § 133 (1932); see Note, supra, at 1166-68.
126 RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 133(1)(a) (1932); accord United States ex rel. Johnson v. Morley Constr. Co., 98 F.2d 781, 788 (2d Cir.) (laborers working for a construction
company under contract between United States and construction company are donee beneficiaries of the contract), cert. denied sub nom. Maryland Casulaty Co. v. United States ex
rel. Harrington, 305 U.S. 651 (1938); Stilwell Frozen Foods, Inc. v. North British & Mercantile Ins. Co., 184 F. Supp. 629, 634 (W.D. Ark. 1960) (customer of storage company considered donee beneficiary with respect to insurance contract between storage company and insurer); United States v. Dauphin Deposit Trust Co., 50 F. Supp. 73, 75 (M.D. Pa. 1943)
(named beneficiary of United States savings bond holder is donee beneficiary of contract
between United States and registered bondholder).
127 RESTATEiMENT OF CONTRACTS § 133(1)(b) (1932); accord Ar-Tik Sys., Inc. v. Dairy
Queen, Inc., 302 F.2d 496, 504 (3d Cir. 1962) (patent owner was creditor beneficiary under
contract between licensee and licensee's assignee); Nebraska Bridge Supply & Lumber Co. v.
Deakin, 109 Colo. 367, 369, 125 P.2d 962, 964 (1942) (bankrupt lumber seller is creditor
beneficiary of contractor that assumed his debt).
128 RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 133(1)(c) (1932); see Johnson Farm Equip. Co. v.
Cook, 230 F.2d 119, 124 (8th Cir. 1956); Isbrandtsen Co. v. Local 1291, Int'l Longshoremen's
Ass'n, 204 F.2d 495, 498 (3d Cir. 1953); Coley v. English, 235 Ark. 215, 216, 357 S.W.2d 529,
530-31 (1962).
129 RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 147 (1932); accord Hamilton & Spiegel, Inc. v. Board
of Educ., 233 Md. 196, _ 195 A.2d 710, 711-12 (1963); Spivak v. Madison-54th Realty Co.,
60 Misc. 2d 483, 483, 303 N.Y.S.2d 128, 134 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 1969); Johnston v.
Oregon Bank, 285 Or. 423, 427, 591 P.2d 746, 750 (1979).
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generally representative of the law at the time,' it soon became
apparent that not all third party beneficiary cases logically fall into
these two relatively narrow classes of donee and creditor beneficiaries.' In discussing the weakness of the categories, one commentator noted that "a complex fact situation is often beyond
their scope.' 1 32 This category structure simply could not explain
the result reached in many cases. 133
The Restatement Second of Contracts retains the term "incidental beneficiary" to describe one who acquires no rights under a
contract, 34 and adopts a new term, "intended beneficiary," to describe one who does acquire rights under a contract.3 5 Section 302
of the Restatement Second provides:
(1) Unless otherwise agreed between promisor and promisee, a
beneficiary of a promise is an intended beneficiary if recognition
of a right to performance in the beneficiary is appropriate to effectuate the intention of the parties and either
(a) the performance of the promise will satisfy an obli130See, e.g., 4 A. CORBIN,supra note 116, § 774, at 6 (classification of third parties with
enforceable contractual rights into either donee or creditor beneficiaries was widely recognized); 2 S. WILLISTON, supra note 77, § 356, at 828-29 (great weight of authority acknowledges right of donee and creditor beneficiaries to enforce contracts); see also Mutual Benefit
Life Ins. Co. v. Ellis, 125 F.2d 127, 130 (2d Cir.) (donee beneficiary may sue on contract to
which he is not a party), cert. denied, 316 U.S. 665 (1942); I.P.C. Distribs., Inc. v. Chicago
Moving Picture Mach. Operators Union, 132 F. Supp. 294, 297 (N.D. IMI.1955) (acknowledging that weight of authority permits creditor beneficiaries to recover on contract).
131See, e.g., Hamill v. Maryland Casualty Co., 209 F.2d 338, 340-41 (10th Cir. 1954);
Harris v. Waikane Corp., 484 F. Supp. 372, 379 (D. Hawaii 1980); McCain v. Stephens, 80
Ariz. 306, 309, 297 P.2d 352, 355 (1956).
"3 Note, supra note 125, at 1169.
'3 See Note, supra note 121, at 883-85. Judicial response to the first Restatement's
classification system reflected the inadequacies and weaknesses inherent therein. Id. at 884.
Some courts permitted recovery to third party beneficiaries notwithstanding the third
party's failure to meet the definitional requirements of donee beneficiaries or creditor beneficiaries, while others interpreted the Restatement too restrictively. Id.
134RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF CONTRACTS § 302(2) (1979); see id. comment e;accord
Holbrook v. Pitt, 643 F.2d 1261, 1270 (7th Cir. 1981) (third party whom the parties did not
intend to benefit considered an incidental beneficiary lacking cognizable legal rights under
the contract); Westhampton House, Inc. v. Carey, 506 F. Supp. 215, 217 (E.D.N.Y. 1980)
(third party beneficiary may not sue on a contract when the benefit merely is incidental to
contract performance); Little v. Union Trust Co., 45 Md. App. 178, 180, 412 A.2d 1251, 1253
(Ct. Spec. App. 1980)(incidental beneficiary has no cause of action against either promisor
or promisee).
131RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OP CONTRACTS § 302(1) (1979); see id. comment a; accord
Beckman Cotton Co. v. First Nat'l Bank, 666 F.2d 181, 183 (5th Cir. 1982) (contract beneficiary may maintain action thereon only if an intended beneficiary); Richardson Eng'g Co. v.
International Business Mach. Corp., 554 F. Supp. 467, 471 (D. Vt. 1981) (intended beneficiary of a lien waiver is entitled to enforce the clause containing such waiver).
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gation of the promisee to pay money to the beneficiary; or
(b) the circumstances indicate that the promisee intends
to give the beneficiary the benefit of the promised
performance.
is a beneficiary who is not an in(2) An incidental1 beneficiary
36
tended beneficiary.

Thus, the draftsmen have supplemented the old categories with a
new standard, the manifestation in the original contract of an intention to benefit a third party.
If one examines the contract between a depositor and his
bank, it is doubtful that any specific intent to benefit checkholders
will be found. Professor Corbin concluded:
The bank contracts with the depositor to honor his checks and
drafts-to pay out to his order. This contract is not made for the
and drafts, and does not give
benefit of the holders of such checks
137
them a right against the bank.

Rather, a depositor opens a checking account primarily for his own
benefit, to obtain a convenient, inexpensive, and relatively risk-free
means of making payment to third parties while maintaining the
fund in a safe place.13 8
There has been growing criticism of the courts' preoccupation

with "intent," 139 and it has been suggested that courts should
"look instead to actual reliance and commercial and social policies
as the ultimate criteria for the determination of third party beneficiary controversies." 4 Professor Farnsworth recently observed
that "[t]he law of contract beneficiaries has not been unaffected by
the increasing role played by reliance in contract law."' 1 The commentary to section 302 of the Second Restatement of Contracts
§ 302 (1979).
4 A. CoPmN, supra note 116, § 779F, at 52 (footnote omitted).
I" See 5A BANKS AND BANKiNO, supra note 3, § 4a, at 25 (purpose of general deposit is
to protect funds and to provide for convenience and benefit of depositor).
13 See Jones, Legal Protection of Third Party Beneficiaries: On Opening Courthouse
Doors, 46 U. Cw. L. REV.313, 320 (1977); Note, supranote 121, at 891-92; Note, supra note
125, at 1172-73.
140 Note, supra note 125, at 1174; see E. FARNSWORTH, supra note 118, § 10.3, at 725
(1982) (reliance aspect of contract law affecting third party beneficiary law); cf. Macaulay,
Private Legislation and the Duty to Read-Business Run by IBM Machine, The Law of
Contracts and Credit Cards, 19 VAW. L. Rnv. 1051, 1060-61 (1966) (courts should solve
cases pursuant to "transactional policy" that takes into account the factors of assumption of
risk and reasonable reliance); Note, supra note 125, at 1172 (third party beneficiary law
must expand scope of inquiry to accommodate commercial needs and market policies).
1
E. FARNSWOaTH, supra note 118, § 10.3, at 725.
136RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF CoNTRACTs
137
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specifically provides that "if the beneficiary would be reasonable in
relying on the promise as manifesting an intention to confer a right
on him, he is an intended beneficiary.114 2 Farnsworth, pointing to

this comment and to section 90 of the Second Restatement, which
speaks of reliance by "action or forbearance on the part of a promisee or third person,"14 concludes that "even though a third person is not an intended beneficiary of a promise, his reliance on the
promise may give him a right against the promisor." 144 Moreover,

at least one court has relied on the language of section 90 in upholding recovery by a third person who had relied on an agreement
between other persons.1 4 5 No one has suggested that a third party

can make himself a beneficiary merely by acting in reliance upon a
contract. 46 A third party, however, should have rights under a contract where that contract creates reasonable expectations on his

1 47
part and induces him to change his position in reliance upon it.

If one focuses on the "reasonable expectations" of a
checkholder, it is clear that he should have rights under the contract between the depositor and his bank. Although courts now
speak of an express or implied contract that obligates the bank to
honor its depositors' checks,148 they long have recognized the "uni142

RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF CONTRACTS

§ 302

comment d (1979); accord Commercial

Ins. Co. v. Pacific-Peru Constr. Corp., 558 F.2d 948, 953-54 (9th Cir. 1977); Guy v. Liederbach, 279 Pa. Super. 543, 547, 421 A.2d 333, 337 (1980).
143 RESTATEMENT (SEcoND)
OF CONTRACTS § 90 (1979). Section 90(1) provides, in partA promise which the promisor should reasonably expect to induce action or
forbearance on the part of the promisee or a third person and which does induce
such action or forbearance is binding if injustice can be avoided only by enforcement of the promise.
Id.

144 E. FARNSWORTH, supra note 118, § 10.3, at 725; accord Note, supra note 125, at
1188-89 (upon establishment of justifiable reliance, third party has action against promisor).
But cf. Boyer, PromissoryEstoppel: Requirements and Limitations of the Doctrine, 98 U.
PA. L. REv. 459, 465 (1950) ("[i]t asks too much of a promisor to require that he consider
whether or not his promise will induce action by a third party")(emphasis in original).
145 See Aronowicz v. Nalley's, Inc., 30 Cal. App. 3d 27, 44-45, 106 Cal. Rptr. 424, 434-35
(1973) (promisor who knew of third parties' justifiable reliance is to be estopped from denying validity of action commenced by third party). But cf. C.R. Frederick, Inc. v. SterlingSalem Corp., 507 F.2d 319, 322 (9th Cir. 1974) (courts have been cautious in applying the
principles of section 90 to third party beneficiary cases).
246 See, e.g., White v. Alaska Ins. Guar. Ass'n, 592 P.2d 367, 369 (Alaska 1979); Kirst v.
Silna, 103 Cal. App. 3d 759, 763, 163 Cal. Rptr. 230, 232 (1980).
1,7 See 4 A. CORBIN, supra note 116, § 775, at 8; E. FARNSWORTH, supra note 118, § 10.3,
at 725.
148 See Ma v. Community Bank, 494 F. Supp. 252, 256 (E.D. Wis. 1980), modified on
appeal, 686 F.2d 459 (7th Cir. 1982); Peterson v. Carstensen, 249 N.W.2d 622, 624 (Iowa
1977); Brigham v. McCabe, 20 N.Y.2d 525, 530-31, 232 N.E.2d 327, 330, 285 N.Y.S.2d 294,
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versal usage" of banks to cash checks drawn by depositors when
sufficient funds are on hand. 149 Hence, while a party taking a check
does rely upon the credit of the parties to that instrument, he
takes the check on the understanding that as long as sufficient
funds are available, and payment has not been stopped by the
drawer, the check will be honored by the bank.1 50 Banks certainly
are aware of this understanding, and of the expectations of
checkholders. Thus, where a checkholder reasonably relies on the
agreement between a depositor and his bank, and the promisor
bank is fully aware of this reliance, the checkholder should be
granted rights under the agreement.
LIABILITY BASED UPON NEGLIGENCE

At common law, in the absence of privity, a party could not
maintain an action in tort for harm caused by another's negligent
performance of a contract. 51 Thus, professional and commercial
enterprises owed no common-law duty to non-contracting parties.1 52 This generally included banks, which were found to owe no
298 (1967).
19 See, e.g., Cincinnati, H. & D. R.R. v. Metropolitan Nat'l Bank, 54 Ohio St. 60, 61, 42
N.E. 700, 701 (1896) ("universal usage of banks to cash the checks drawn by a depositor
where he has sufficient unincumbered balance standing to his credit"); see also United
States Shipping Bd. Emergency Fleet Corp. v. Atlantic, 5 F.2d 529, 532 (D. Mass. 1925)
(bank obligated to honor checks of depositor as long as sufficient funds exist); Castaline v.
National City Bank, 244 Mass. 416, 417, 138 N.E. 398, 398 (1923) (bank is bound to honor
checks of depositor if sufficient unencumbered funds exist).
"o See 5A BANKs AND BANKING, supra note 3, § 204, at 544-49 (holder naturally expects
check to be honored, provided that sufficient funds exist and that check has not been
stopped); see also H. BAILEY, supra note 87, § 18.3 (holder expects to be paid with drawer's
funds); M. BIGELow, THE LAW OF BiLLs, NoTEs, AND CHECKS §§ 225-229 (3d ed. 1928)
(holder expects drawer to have sufficient funds to cover check).
I'l See W. PROssER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 93, at 622 (4th ed. 1971) ("general rule, which prevailed into the twentieth century, [was] that there was no liability of a
contracting party to one with whom he was not in 'privity' "); see also Winterbottom v.
Wright, 152 Eng. Rep. 402, 405 (1842) (breach of contract with respect to a failure to keep a
mailcoach in proper repair provided no legal recourse against manufacturer to injured passenger); National Say. Bank v. Ward, 100 U.S. 195, 203 (1879) (no liability to third party for
loss sustained by virtue of reliance on a negligently prepared title abstract because of lack of
privity).
152 See, e.g., Ford v. Sturgis, 14 F.2d 253, 255 (D.C. Cir. 1926) (building contractor's
negligence does not render him liable to third person killed by building's collapse); Buckley
v. Gray, 110 Cal. 339, 339, 42 P. 900, 900 (1895) (attorney not liable to third person deprived
of portion of an estate due to attorney's negligence in drafting will); Landell v. Lybrand, 264
Pa. 406, 406, 107 A. 783, 783 (1919) (company accountant not liable to investors who bought
shares in company on basis of his report).
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duty to noncustomers. 153
The privity requirement reflected more than a mere clinging
to ancient historical concepts. One writer observed:
The privity requirement reflects the philosophical beliefs of
nineteenth century common law. Contract law in the nineteenth
century had its roots in the free enterprise theory that presupposed that a duty should arise only by the will of the individual
contracting freely. Reflecting these beliefs, the privity doctrine
became a valuable tool in accomplishing the joint goals of industrialization and professional development."M
Courts were concerned with protecting the fledgling industrial
revolution, and the various emerging professional and commercial
enterprises.15 5 The fear of the impact of indeterminate liability on
business greatly influenced the courts. 15 6
A clear expression of this concern can be found in Ultramares
Corp. v. Touche,1 57 where a party who had relied on a negligently
prepared audit was denied recovery for his economic losses because
153 See, e.g., Laclede Bank v. Schuler, 120 U.S. 511, 514 (1887) (holder cannot maintain
action against bank on an unaccepted check, since in that situation the holder is not in
privity with the bank); Bank of Republic v. Millard, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 152, 156 (1869) (no
foundation for action commenced by checkholder against a bank without privity); Cincinnati, H. & D.R.R. v. Metropolitan Nat'l Bank, 54 Ohio St. 60, 62, 42 N.E. 700, 703 (1896)
(until a check is accepted holder cannot maintain an action against the bank because the
latter owes the holder no legal duty).
I" Comment, Liability to Third Parties for Economic Injury: Privity as a Useful
Animal, or a Blind Imitation of the Past, 12 Sw. L. RPv. 87, 118 (1981); see also Rintala,
The Supreme Court of California 1968-1969 Foreword: "Status" Concepts in the Law of
Torts, 58 CALIF. L. REV. 80, 83-84 (1970) (nineteenth century values of maximizing individual freedom and encouraging economic progress reflected in the concept of imposing liability
only on a party that unreasonably creates a foreseeable risk of harm to another and only
when the relationship between the parties so warrants).
155See Seavey, Mr. Justice Cardozo and the Law of Torts, 52 HARv. L. REV. 372, 379
(1939). Professor Seavey suggests that the landmark decision Winterbottom v. Wright and
its immediate progeny exemplify protective judicial legislation afforded manufacturers who
were unable to pay for the consequences of their employees' mistakes. Id.; see also W. PROSSER, supra note 151, § 96, at 622 (privity rule of Winterbottom v. Wright was a reflection of
19th-century concern that imposing liability on manufacturers for injuries caused to nonimmediate buyers would burden them too heavily).
15 W. PROSSER, supra note 151, §§ 93, 96 ("fear of burdening defendants with a crushing responsibility" has led many courts to deny liability in the absence of privity of contract). American courts were greatly influenced by the forebodings of Lord Abinger in
Winterbottom v. Wright, where he observed that "the most absurd and outrageous consequences" were likely to occur, "unless we confine the operation of such contracts as this to
the parties entered into them." Winterbottom v. Wright, 152 Eng. Rep. 402, 405 (1842); see
infra notes 161-165 and accompanying text.
157 255 N.Y. 170, 174 N.E. 441 (1931).
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he lacked privity with the accountant."5" Judge Cardozo expressed
the concern that:
[I]f liability for negligence exists, a thoughtless slip or blunder,
the failure to detect a theft or forgery beneath the cover of deceptive entries, may expose accountants to a liability in an indeterminate amount for an indeterminate time to an indeterminate
class.

159

This same concern was articulated by courts considering the
liability of a bank to a checkholder for wrongful dishonor.160 The
Supreme Court even suggested that if checkholders were permitted
to sue banks for wrongful dishonor, then "bankers would be compelled to abandon altogether the business of keeping deposit ac1 1
counts for their customers.''
Cost and risk spreading factors were not considered by these
courts. 62 As malpractice and other types of protective insurance
158 Id. at 188-89, 174 N.E. at 448. Fred Stern & Co. (Stern), a rubber importer, hired
Touche, Niven & Co. (Touche), the defendant accounting firm, to prepare and certify, pursuant to an audit, a balance sheet representing "a true and correct view" of Stem's net
worth. Id. at 173-74, 174 N.E. at 442. Touche knew that Stern would exhibit the certified
balance sheet to banks, creditors, stockholders, and merchants in order to borrow money
and obtain the extensive credit necessary to finance operations. Id. Nevertheless, it certified
Stem's net worth at over one million dollars when in reality the corporation was insolvent.
Id. at 173-75, 174 N.E. at 442. Although Stern had falsified its books by setting forth fictitious assets, a jury could have found that closer inquiry by the defendant would have revealed the company's true financial status. Id. at 175, 174 N.E. at 442-43. On the strength of
Touche's certificate, however, the plaintiff corporation advanced large sums of money to
Stern for rubber purchases in exchange for executory assignments of payments arising from
future sales. Id. Because of Stem's true financial status, the security for some of these loans
was either inadequate or nonexistent. Id. at 175-76, 174 N.E. at 443. When "the house of
cards collapsed," the plaintiff sued the accounting firm in both fraud and negligence, seeking recovery for losses incurred in reliance on the certificate. Id. at 176, 174 N.E. at 443. The
New York Court of Appeals refused to impose the same duty of care on the accounting firm
toward indeterminate third parties as on parties linked by contract, holding that absent a
contractual relationship liability for misstatement could be predicated only upon fraud. Id.
at 179-81, 174 N.E. at 444-45.
159Id. at 179, 174 N.E. at 444.
10 See, e.g., Bank of the Republic v. Millard, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 152, 157 (1869) (finding
privity between banker and holder may result in recognizing a "right of action upon one
promise for the same thing, existing in two distinct persons at the same time").
161 Id. For a brief discussion of the Millard Court's repudiation of the third party beneficiary, see supra notes 32-34 and accompanying text.
1'2See W. PROSSER, supra note 151, § 83, at 547 (despite commentators' insistence that
risk-spreading factors are revolutionizing tort law, little impact of these factors can be discered in judicial decisions); Comment, supra note 154, at 123-24 (courts should consider
risk-spreading factors when assessing third party recovery instead of relying on "the artificial and inflexible bar of privity"). But see Freezer, Capacity to Bear Loss as a Factor in
the Decision of Certain Types of Tort Cases, 78 U. PA. L. REV. 805, 810 (1930) (a growing
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became available, however, the privity requirement began to
erode. 6 3 This erosion was fueled by recognition of the changes in
the social and economic structure of our society and in the public
nature of professional and commercial enterprises.'" Today, it is
generally acknowledged that the increased size and power of American business warrants increased responsibility.
In 1931, Judge Cardozo wrote that "[tihe assault upon the citadel of privity is proceeding in these days apace. 1'1 5 This assault
has been well-documented elsewhere.'
It has been particularly
successful where negligence actions are brought by third persons
who have suffered personal injury 6 7 or property damage.6 8 Where
number of courts consider capacity to bear the loss as a factor in making awards).
1' McNiece & Thornton, Is the Law of Negligence Obsolete?, 26 ST. JOHN'S L. REv.
255, 260-61, 265 (1952) (expansion of liability to third parties may not have been "directly
traceable" to the increase of liability insurance but it was an "important consideration" of
the judiciary in making these changes); see also Besser, Privity?-An Obsolete Approach to
the Liability of Accountants to Third Parties, 7 SETON HALL L. REV. 507, 534-35 & nn. 11415 (1976) (rationale for continued reliance on privity doctrine based on fear of prohibitive
cost or unavailability of malpractice insurance refuted by recent surveys showing use and

affordability of such insurance) (citing PLI,

PROFESSIONAL LmiLrrY INSURANCE FOR LAWYERS

AccouNTANTs 259-73 (1976)). But see Comment, Auditors' Third Party Liability: An
Ill-ConsideredExtension of the Law, 46 WASH. L. REV. 675, 698-705 (1971) (extended liability will inflate insurance rates, adversely affecting small businesses and national economy).
18 See Tobriner, Retrospect: Ten Years on the CaliforniaSupreme Court, 20 UCLA L.
REV. 5, 12 (1972) (courts responding to economic and social tensions that "press upon the
legal status quo" have begun to forge a status-based liability for public enterprises); Comment, supra note 154, at 119-20 (contemporary changes in professional, commercial, and
industrial enterprises since Ultramares decision require expansion of liability to protect
third parties); see also Rintala, supra note 154, at 83-92 (socioeconomic changes have rendered privity doctrine obsolete); Note, Accountants' Liability to Third Partiesfor an Audit,
52 MARQ. L. REV. 158, 161-62 (1968) (privity outmoded by changes in the size and organization of business).
161 Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, 255 N.Y. 170, 180, 174 N.E. 441, 445 (1931).
16 See, e.g., Prosser, The Fall of the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 50
MINN. L. REV. 791, 791-800, 817-20 (1966) (documenting death of privity requirement in
products liability actions) [hereinafter cited as Prosser, The Fall of the Citadel]; Prosser,
The Assault Upon the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 69 YALE L.J. 1099, 1099
(1960); Note, supra note 164, at 160-63 (discussing alternatives to and various views of viability of privity doctrine).
167 Prosser, The Fall of the Citadel,supra note 166, at 820-22; see, e.g., Dagley v. Armstrong Rubber Co., 344 F.2d 245, 252 (1965) (administrator of truck driver's estate recovered
damages for wrongful death against tire manufacturer despite lack of privity), aff'd, 371
F.2d 205 (7th Cir. 1966); MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N.Y. 382, 394, 111 N.E. 1050,
1054-55 (1916) (automobile manufacturer held liable for personal injuries to car owner
caused by defective wheel).
I Prosser, The Fall of the Citadel, supra note 166, at 820-22; see, e.g., Todd Shipyards Corp. v. United States, 69 F. Supp. 609, 610 (D. Me. 1947) (expanding MacPherson
holding to encompass property damage); Steinberg v. Coda Roberson Constr. Co., 79 N.M.
AND
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a party not in privity seeks to recover for mere economic loss, however, the assault has proceeded more slowly to avoid opening the
door to unlimited liability.16 9 Professor James explains the courts'
reluctance to so extend liability, noting that "the physical consequences of negligence usually have been limited, but indirect economic repercussions of negligence may be far wider, indeed virtually open-ended."1 70
Nevertheless, in recent years, an increasing number of courts
have permitted recovery for purely economic injuries caused by the
negligent torts of third parties.1 71 Because of the fear of indeterminate liability, however, liability generally has been circumscribed
by a foreseeability standard, 17 2 with some courts requiring actual
reliance by third persons within the contemplation of the parties
when the transaction took place or the services were rendered. 3
In Biakanja v. Irving,174 the California Supreme Court employed a
balancing approach to determine whether recovery should be extended to economically injured parties who are not in privity of
contract with their defendants. 5 This approach has received the
approval of numerous courts across the country, as it provides a
123, 124, 440 P.2d 798, 799 (1968) (privity not essential to recovery for economic loss arising
from negligent construction); Gosnell v. Zink, 325 P.2d 965, 967 (Okla. 1958) (permitting
plaintiff to recover for property damage resulting from fire caused by furnace negligently
manufactured by defendant).
2" See Besser, supra note 163, at 510-12; Comment, supra note 154, at 89.
170 James, Limitations on Liability ForEconomic Loss Caused by Negligence: A Pragmatic Appraisal, 25 VAN. L. REV. 43, 45 (1972).
171 See, e.g., Hoskins v. Jackson Grain Co., 63 So. 2d 514, 516 (Fla. 1953) (farmer may
recover business losses against wholesaler that misnamed seeds); Santor v. A & M
Karagheusian, Inc., 44 N.J. 52, 63, 207 A.2d 305, 310 (1965) (ultimate purchaser of carpet
may recover against manufacturer for breach of implied warranty of reasonable fitness);
Mazetti v. Armour & Co., 75 Wash. 662, 664, 135 P. 633, 636 (1913) (restaurant owner has
cause of action against food manufacturer for business losses resulting from reputation of
serving bad food).
172 See, e.g., Licata v. Spector, 26 Conn. Supp. 378, 379, 225 A.2d 28, 29-30 (Super. Ct.
1966) (liability imposed on attorney whose negligent will drafting deprived third party of
legacy, since plaintiff's existence and reliance were foreseeable); Craig v. Everett M. Brooks
Co., 351 Mass. 497, 500, 222 N.E.2d 752, 755 (1967) (third party plaintiff may recover for
economic loss where type and extent of damage were foreseeable); Glanzer v. Shepard, 233
N.Y. 236, 240-42, 135 N.E. 275, 276-77 (1922) (contract requiring defendant weigher to certify weight of bean shipment for sole benefit of and delivery to third party gave that party
an actionable negligence claim for economic loss, since the prospective use of the shipment
was known).
1'3See, e.g., Ryan v. Kanne, 170 N.W.2d 395, 401-03 (Iowa 1969) (lack of privity no bar
to recovery by third party who specifically relied on accountant's financial statements).
174 49 Cal. 2d 647, 320 P.2d 16 (1958).
275Id. at 650, 320 P.2d at 19.
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flexible and workable test for determining when liability should be
extended to certain third parties."'
In Biakanja, an attorney failed to have the will he prepared
properly attested, because he mistakenly believed that a notarial
seal could be used as a substitute for witnesses. 1 " The will was
denied probate and the plaintiff, instead of receiving all the property as bequeathed, received only one-eighth of the estate by intestate succession. 17 8 The court concluded that whether a defendant
should be liable to a third person not in privity is a matter of policy and involved the balancing of various factors, which included
the following:
(1) "the extent to which the transaction was intended to affect
the plaintiff,"
(2) "the forseeability of harm to him,"
(3) "the degree of certainty that the plaintiff suffered injury,"
(4) "the closeness of the connection between the defendant's
conduct and the injury suffered,"
(5) "the moral blame attached to the defendant's
conduct, and"
''
(6) "the policy of preventing future harm. 117
The court noted that "the 'end and aim' of the transaction was to
provide for the passing of [the decedent's] estate to plaintiff,"180
178

See, e.g., Union Oil Co. v. Oppen, 501 F.2d 558, 566-67 (9th Cir. 1974) (applying

Biakanja balancing test to hold oil company liable to fishermen for economic loss resulting
from negligent oil spills); Lucas v. Hamm, 56 Cal. 2d 583, 585-86, 364 P.2d 685, 687-88, 15
Cal. Rptr. 821, 823 (1961) (using Biakanja balancing test to determine liability of attorney
to beneficiaries of will), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 987 (1962); Guy v. Liederbach, 279 Pa. Super.
543, 545, 421 A.2d 333, 335 (1980) (utilizing California's balancing test instead of privity
doctrine in determining attorney's liability to third party). Commentators have also approved of the Biakanja balancing test. See, e.g., Besser, supra note 163, at 522-24.
(Biakanja provides workable test to free professional liability actions from privity restrictions); Note, Negligent Interference with Economic Expectancy: The Case for Recovery, 16
STAN. L. REv. 664, 693-94 (1964) (relaxing of the rule against recovery for negligent interference with economic expectancy recommended in Biakanja will serve interests of society);
Comment, supra note 154, at 128 (Biakanjaprovides "a consistent approach to third party
recovery for economic injury").
177 49 Cal. 2d at 649, 320 P.2d at 18.
178 Id. at 648, 320 P.2d at 17.
"0 Id. at 650, 320 P.2d at 19.

180 Id. at 649, 320 P.2d at 19 (quoting Glanzer v. Shepard, 233 N.Y. 236, 241, 135 N.E.

275, 277 (1922)). The Biakanja court concluded that the defendant must have known when
he notarized the will that error on his part would result in loss to the plaintiff, and must
have known what the nature and extent of this loss would be. 49 Cal. 2d at 649, 320. P.2d at
19. The court also noted that causation was established. Id. at 648, 320 P.2d at 19. The
court distinguished the facts at issue from those in Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, 255 N.Y.
170, 174 N.E. 441 (1931). Biakanja, 49 Cal. 2d at 648, 320 P.2d at 19. In Ultramaresthe
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and after considering the various factors concluded that the plaintiff should be allowed recovery despite the absence of privity. 11
While Biakanja dealt specifically with attorney negligence, its rationale has since been extended to other types of 1professional
and
82
commercial negligence, including bank negligence.
For example, in Robinson v. Colebrook Guaranty Savings
Bank,1 8 3 the plaintiff brought an action against a bank for its negli-

gent failure to advise its depositor properly regarding the establishment of a survivorship account for the benefit of the plain-

tiff.184 After discussing Biakanja, the court concluded that the

transaction "gave rise to a relationship between the defendant and
the plaintiff, calling for the exercise of care by the defendant to
prevent the injury which the plaintiff later suffered." '5 The court
recognized that considerations surrounding the establishment of
survivorship accounts were well known to persons engaged in the
banking business and concluded that "[o]rdinary care required
that the defendant take reasonable measures to avoid the injury
potential advantage from the contract was collateral to the transaction, whereas in Biakanja
the focal point of the notary's action was a benefit to the plaintiff. Id. at 649, 320 P.2d at 19.
Moreover, the plaintiff corporation in Ultramares suffered economic loss, but neither the
extent of this loss, nor the existence of the plaintiff itself could reasonably be foreseen.
Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, 255 N.Y. 170, 181, 174 N.E. 441, 445 (1931). In Biakanja,however, both the existence of the plaintiff and of his loss were foreseeable. 49 Cal. 2d at 649,
320 P.2d at 19.
181 See, e.g., Union Oil Co. v. Oppen, 501 F.2d 558, 569 (9th Cir. 1974) (oil company);
Sabella v. Wisler, 59 Cal. 2d 21, 25, 377 P.2d 889, 893, 27 Cal. Rptr. 689, 693 (1963) (contractors); Kent v. Bartlett, 49 Cal. App. 3d 724, 728-30, 122 Cal. Rptr. 615, 617-18 (1975)
(surveyors); Rhodes-Haverty Partnership v. Robert & Co., 293 S.E.2d 876, 878 (Ga. Ct. App.
1982) (architectural and engineering firm), aff'd, 300 S.E.2d 503 (Ga. 1983); Pelham v.
Griesheimer, 93 IlM. App. 3d 751, 755, 417 N.E.2d 882, 885-86 (1981) (attorney); Stewart v.
Sbarro, 142 N.J. Super. 581, 588, 362 A.2d 581, 588, (attorneys), cert. denied, 72 N.J. 459,
371 A.2d 63 (1976).
182 See, e.g., Robinson v. Colebrook Guar. Say. Bank, 109 N.H. 382, 384, 254 A.2d 837,
839 (1969); Connor v. Great W. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 73 Cal. Rptr. 369, 377-78, 447 P.2d 609,
617-18 (1968).
183 109 N.H. 382, 254 A.2d 837 (1969).
:I Id. at 384, 254 A.2d at 839.
185 Id. at 383, 254 A.2d at 838. In Robinson, the depositor wanted to open an account of
such a nature that the funds therein would pass to the plaintiff upon his death. Id. at 384,
254 A.2d at 838. Though the bank advised him that a joint account with right of survivorship was the typical way this result was accomplished, an ordinary account, designated as
payable to the plaintiff on the depositor's death, was set up at the depositor's insistence. Id.
at 383, 254 A.2d at 838. It was held that since the account was not a joint account, it did not
become the plaintiff's property on the depositor's death, and the bank was alleged to have
been negligent in failing to consult legal counsel as to the effect of the type of account
established. Id. at 383, 254 A.2d at 838-39.
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which would result to the plaintiff by frustration of the depositor's
intent.""""

When the various Biakanja factors are considered, it is clear
that a bank should be required to exercise ordinary care to avoid
injuring checkholders. Persons engaged in the banking business
understand that depositors will be issuing checks to third parties,
and it is foreseeable that these parties may be injured by a wrongful dishonor. The connection between the bank's action and the
injury suffered is clear. While a bank that mistakenly dishonors a
check may not have acted in a morally reprehensible manner, as
between the negligent bank and the innocent checkholder it would
seem that the bank should bear the loss.
Furthermore, recognition of liability would not impose an undue burden on the banking industry. As discussed earlier, when a
check has been dishonored the checkholder will seldom find
it nec187
essary to resort to an action against the drawee bank.

Most

often, he will simply notify the drawer of the dishonor. The drawer
will then contact the drawee bank and see that the checkholder is
paid. If there are other parties to the instrument, the checkholder
may look to them for payment. Permitting a checkholder to recover from a bank when necessary, however, will not seriously burden the banking business. Certainly an innocent reliant party is
less capable of bearing a loss caused by a bank's negligence than
the bank itself, which can insure against its losses and, if necessary, pass the cost of such insurance onto its customers.
CONCLUSION

For the past one hundred years in this country, the only assurance that checks would not be negligently or even capriciously dishonored by the drawee has been found solely in the drawer's cause
of action against the drawee for wrongful dishonor. This Article
suggests that this conclusion is not dictated by the Uniform Commercial Code. While a clear rule that the drawee is under no liability to the checkholder provides an element of certainty, and eliminates the need to resolve issues of "ordinary care" and "forseeable
186
Id. The Robinson court found that the depositor placed no reliance on the bank to
accomplish the result he sought, and in fact had ignored the bank's warnings about the risk
of injury to the plaintiff. Id. at 385, 254 A.2d at 840. The plaintiff's loss, therefore, was not
caused by any negligence on the part of the bank. Id.
187 See supra notes 8-9 and accompanying text.
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damages," this certainty provides little comfort to an injured
checkholder who has no remedy. Recent developments in contract
and tort law, particularly the latter, provide a theoretical framework for imposing liability on negligent banks. Moreover, the
banking industry can handle the slight additional burden such liability would impose upon it. Just as there has been a growing recognition that professionals such as lawyers, accountants, and architects should no longer be insulated from liability for their
negligence or breach of contract when certain foreseeable third
parties are injured, so must courts break with the past and recognize that a bank's improper actions in dishonoring a check may
injure a foreseeable third party. In seeking relief, such an injured
party should be permitted to look to the bank that caused the

injury.

